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Steady Hands Needed
Prologue: Steady hands needed for
turbulent times – the DFAT secretaries
1979–99
Trevor Wilson
Foreign ministries the world over have many similar features, but they all differ
significantly in their operational and staffing needs from their domestic ministry
counterparts. Their essential work is the management of all aspects of bilateral
relations between countries; they are also deeply involved in the activities of
multilateral organisations and are routinely called upon to respond to
unpredictable international events over which they have little or no control. At
the high policy level, the subject matter of their work ranges from trade and
security to human rights and the environment. For most of these pursuits, foreign
ministries function according to international rules that are often also the subject
of domestic laws to enforce them. At the other end of their responsibilities are
the travel-related consular and passport services so much in demand in this age
of globalisation. In this period, international events assumed much greater
immediacy for domestic policy-makers, thanks mainly to the enormous
improvements in communications which brought international events into the
home more than ever before. For a variety of reasons, therefore, those running
diplomacy need to be keenly aware of both the international environment in
which they operate as well as domestic circumstances and implications. Presiding
over the institution that manages a country’s international relations on a daily
basis is, therefore, no small task.
As an earlier review of the challenges for reforming Australia’s foreign service
acknowledged,1  operationally, striking a balance between these sometimes
competing interests requires particular judgment and finesse on a day-to-day
basis. Ensuring that administrative systems, communications infrastructure and
personnel practices (recruiting, training, postings) meet the needs of such a
diverse and unpredictable agenda calls for longer-term vision, steadiness of
direction and commitment to outcomes. Also, educating and informing other
affected parties, whether at home or abroad, is critically important. Instant
communications has meant more, not less, pressure on the system, its employees
and, above all, its managers. In many respects, higher levels of probity, a greater
degree of accountability and much more transparency have come to be the
hallmark of most Australian government agencies and Australia’s foreign service
has not been exempt from this trend.
1
The position of secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT) is a senior position in the Australian Public Service. With a staff
(including overseas staff) numbering around 3,500 in 2007, it is a middle-sized
department (for comparison, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry has 4,200, while Treasury only has 921). Appendix 1 summarises the
changes in staff numbers and the breakdown in types of staff over this period.
The number of Australia-based staff which initially declined, subsequently
increased as security concerns developed world-wide, but the number of locally
engaged staff — critical for the operations of overseas missions — declined by
around 25 per cent as part of ongoing budgetary constraints. Despite its
increasingly well-known responsibilities for passports and consular services,
DFAT is not primarily a ‘client service’ department with the special demands
that these departments make of staff. Nevertheless, being secretary of this
department — with its multi-faceted operations, demanding time-sensitive
response requirements and its manifestation of complex and sometimes
contradictory national interests — is by any measure a challenging job.
If anything, the extent of change that occurred within DFAT during the period
1979–99 is somewhat understated in the following chapters. In 1979, the
Department of Foreign Affairs was not very different from what it had always
been: an organisation with a strong distinctive view of itself as being rather
different from the rest of the Australian Public Service (APS) in its commitment
to a ‘higher’ plane of international relations based on commonly accepted and
inviolable rules and procedures.
Then, in 1987, as part of an industrial agreement, the long-established specialised
‘streams’ among DFAT staff (diplomatic versus consular and administrative staff)
were notionally abolished. Within the department, the designation of DFAT
officers as ‘Foreign Affairs Officers’ was abandoned as DFAT personnel were
fully integrated into the APS, sharing the same administrative designations and
working conditions as the rest of the APS. Moreover, given DFAT’s reputation
for being hierarchical, with discriminatory internal career paths, it only adjusted
with difficulty to the public service reforms introduced by the Hawke Labor
Government from 1983 that called for greater delegation of decision-making,
more openness and greater fairness in working conditions and recruitment
throughout the service. Initially, DFAT had grown considerably from the 1970s,
taking on new responsibilities against a background of significant cultural change
in the public sector, but by 2000 its numbers had reduced to 8 per cent below
the level of 1980. While in absolute terms its budget had trebled, its outlays fell
as a proportion of government outlays from 1.99 per cent to 1.22 per cent (see
Appendix 1).
Specifically, the decade 1982–92 was a period of intense and relentless public
stress for DFAT management, in which successive secretaries were deeply
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involved. A series of ‘whistleblower’ allegations of corruption, mismanagement
and poor morale prompted a major inquiry by the Senate Standing Committee
on Finance and Public Administration.2  At the time, departmental leadership
was absorbed in repeated efforts to exorcise these demons that, on the one hand,
often smeared their personal reputations and, on the other, cast a damaging pall
over the department’s personnel management. The passage of time seems to have
dulled the memory of how trying these events were for particular DFAT
secretaries. In the words of the Senate Committee: ‘the cultural change in DFAT
(from reliance on personal relationships to the use of more formal management
systems) … must have added considerably to the stress experienced by many
officers and the Department as a whole.’
While the findings of the Senate Committee inquiry essentially vindicated the
leadership of the Department, which had done ‘as well as could be expected,’
the Committee noted that:
DFAT did not manage aspects of the process of change in a satisfactory
manner … However, it is clear that the changes have been large and
rapid and DFAT must be given credit for the progress it has made (Senate
1992: 155).
Essentially, the inquiry found some signs of ‘systemic management failure’ but
said the department had generally performed satisfactorily and insisted that its
criticisms ‘did not go to any major aspect of the Department’s management and
operations’ (Senate 1992:156). It did, however, call for renewed efforts by DFAT
management to achieve better levels of accountability, transparency and fairness,
and identified 37 ‘housekeeping areas’ where it recommended improvements be
made. However, a minority report submitted by Liberal Party members of the
committee questioned whether DFAT had really resolved many of the issues
satisfactorily and sought further evidence that it was in fact managing its
operations effectively.
One of the underlying challenges for DFAT secretaries then, and ever since, was
the extent to which the department needed specialised staff in areas such as
trade policy, public information, international law, economics and country
experts. While successive secretaries argued the case for the greater flexibility
that multi-skilling delivered, in later years the value of retaining substantial
specialist expertise came to be recognised. ‘Specialist’ skills included language
skills which the department traditionally fostered in Australian diplomats, yet
the only former language officer to become secretary of the department was Dr
Ashton Calvert, who was appointed in 1998. In sum, no secretary of DFAT could
ignore the need for staff who were able to operate effectively and in Australia’s
interests at the intersection of cultures.
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By any measure, the changes to the organisational culture and structure of DFAT
between 1980 and 2000 were dramatic. Some of these changes were those that
occurred within the APS as a whole, such as performance management and
performance pay, but there were additional changes — internal and external
— that affected Foreign Affairs specifically. By 1999, for example, DFAT staff
were promoted and remunerated in the same way as their peers in other
departments; any distinctive ‘foreign service’ features had gone. Symbolic of
this enormous shift, their separate and strongly representative staff association
(which had always dealt with management alongside the traditional unions) had
been disbanded, to be replaced, eventually, by a loosely organised association
with a small membership, no formal industrial negotiating role and little profile.3
By the early 1990s, DFAT SES members were, like their counterparts in all other
departments, employed on Australian Workplace Agreements (which were
individually signed but collectively negotiated agreements) while the remainder
of the staff were on a collectively negotiated Certified Agreement, in line with
the practice in other APS departments, which was a significant change.
Without a doubt the most significant event affecting departmental culture was
the promulgation in 1987 of changed Administrative Arrangements that brought
490 new staff with different backgrounds and responsibilities into the department
from the former Department of Trade and from the Australian Information
Service.4  It was no small shock for staff to find themselves working closely
alongside public servants from different backgrounds who, at first, even used
a different computer network, and considerable departmental leadership was
required for some period to communicate loudly, clearly and consistently that
a new approach to their work was expected. Organisationally, many staff found
themselves in the same work unit as people hailing from another organisation,
although some more technical trade negotiators, for example, remained in much
the same structure as before. These differing approaches were deliberate, as it
was felt that all staff had to be challenged to pursue more sophisticated
policy-making while valuable technical skills (in multilateral trade negotiation,
for example) should not be lost. The secretaries concerned took both a cautious
yet radical line to ensure that more integrated policy formulation occurred.
Interestingly, most staff responded extremely well and surprised the departmental
executive by requesting a deeper integration of staff within a few months. Before
long, many staff sought to cross over into new work.
This major reorganisation was not a ‘world first’. In 1983, Canada had created
a Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.5  More cooperative,
complex policies better attuned to the needs of the times were soon to emerge
from Canberra as well and, in time, it was also realised that leaving the Australian
Trade Commission and the Export Finance Insurance Corporation initially in
other portfolios was an incomplete arrangement. Yet the Australian experiment
was quickly deemed successful, was eventually recognised as something that
4
Steady Hands Needed
should not be reversed, and went on to be copied by several other countries.
For the DFAT secretary, one of the challenging aspects of the amalgamated
department was the parallel requirement for the secretary to serve two ministers
who would not always enjoy entirely harmonious relationships nor always
present departmental staff with fully sychronised tasking. In this dual role,
DFAT secretaries are to this day called upon to exercise more than the usual
amount of political discretion, mostly without problems ever becoming apparent.
The other area of major transforming change for Foreign Affairs, occurring
roughly at the same time (1985–90), was in telecommunications technology.
Telecommunications had always been a central feature of the department’s
operations which included formal responsibility for the government’s overseas
communications. All the secretaries contributing to this publication showed
leadership and considerable readiness to take risks in adopting new
communications technology that would significantly transform the nature of
the department’s daily operations. Reports and information that had previously
taken time to reach the department were now available in real time and almost
immediately. This transformed ministerial, management and public expectations
of government reaction times and added to the burden on DFAT staff for
immediate responses. It may have also contributed to the eventual shift away
from medium-term policy planning. But DFAT’s performance in this area of
modern telecommunications, even though it did not meet all the targets set, was
very credible in comparison with other foreign services. (As late as 2000, in
some overseas posts DFAT telecommunications capabilities were ahead of the
US State Department.)
Reviewing the recollections of the DFAT secretaries in this publication, however,
one is also struck by what the DFAT secretary is and what they are not. In their
authoritative Making of Australian Foreign Policy, Alan Gyngell and Michael
Wesley comment on the considerable authority enjoyed by the DFAT secretary,
but in fact give few examples of how this power might have been exercised. In
fact, the DFAT secretary’s authority in the period under consideration — from
1979 to 1998 — was considerably less than it might have been in the past. The
main reason for this is the reassertion of ministerial control that accompanied
the Hawke Government’s 1983 reforms of the public service and administrative
arrangements. Since then, there has been no doubt that the minister exercised
the final authority and that even many administrative matters formally within
the jurisdiction of the secretary, could not be decided by him without
consultation with the minister.
The secretary of DFAT is more like a CEO of an organisation where many key
decisions are made above him. Crucial in performing the job is giving operational
direction and purpose to the organisation and its staff. This does not come from
the minister or any other person. But the secretary of DFAT cannot be across all
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the detail of running the department. For example, the challenge of managing
the financial accounting — with so many remote branches and in multiple
currencies — is obviously great. It is not surprising that DFAT was one of the
first departments to appoint a professional chief finance officer from outside the
department.
Changes in the Public Service Act in 1976 had also affected the manner in which
secretaries of departments were appointed. These replaced a simple procedure
for appointment by the Governor-General with a selection committee conducted
by the Chairman of the Public Service Board (PSB) to advise the Prime Minister
so that he could make a recommendation to the Governor-General. Peter
Henderson was among the first to be appointed under this new procedure. When
Henderson was replaced by Stuart Harris in 1984, a greatly streamlined process
required the Prime Minister to receive a report from the Chairman of the PSB
which would be the basis for a recommendation to the Governor-General.
Following the abolition of the PSB in 1987, this advisory role was transferred to
the secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. By the time
of the 1999 amendment of the Public Service Act, the appointment of secretaries
had become the responsibility of the Prime Minister himself, not the
Governor-General. In this period as well, governments assumed greater latitude
in setting the remuneration and other employment conditions of departmental
heads, with the Remuneration Tribunal’s role shifting from one of determination
to advice. One result was a greater mix in the remuneration package between
salary and other items, with superannuation allocations becoming increasingly
popular.
Until the 1970s, there was no formal provision or standard practice for the
termination of the appointment of a departmental secretary. Before that, the
principal means of replacing an ‘unwanted’ departmental head was the device
of abolishing the whole department. However, the 1984 changes included a
removal process and were accompanied by a new policy that appointments
would be reviewed at five-yearly intervals. The new arrangements included
provision for compensation in the event of early termination. By the 1990s,
significant performance pay provisions for departmental secretaries had been
introduced. The consequence of all these changes is that, today, the secretary
of DFAT along with his counterparts in the APS can be removed much more
readily than in the past. The position, however, is much more generously
remunerated, although certainly not on the scale of CEOs of business
organisations of a comparable size and with a comparable budget to manage.
Parallel with these changes were the obligations that secretaries assumed under
the new Financial Administration Act of 1997 that reinforced their long-standing
responsibilities for managing their department’s finances. Secretaries assumed
additional financial responsibilities from those previously carried out by the
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Treasury and, later, the Department of Finance or the Public Service Board
(before its abolition). However, secretaries also enjoyed considerable latitude in
how they carried out their responsibilities. Although there was considerable
devolution of responsibility, the corollary of this was potentially more searching
accountability. One result was a much greater level of parliamentary scrutiny
of departmental administration following growth of the Senate Committee system
since 1970 and the House of Representatives committee system established in
1987. Hand in hand with these changes was a broader remit for the
Auditor-General, under new audit legislation.
Most of the expansion of the management role of departmental secretaries
occurred in the period covered by this publication. This represented a
transformation of the position, without in any way diminishing the secretary’s
obligations for providing advice on policy and overseeing the formulation of
that advice. As a result, the modern secretary has more diverse responsibilities,
considerable latitude in the way departmental staff are organised, as well as a
wider range of relationships outside the department. Above all, secretaries have
a higher requirement for accountability on all matters to their ministers.
Some matters always remained outside the secretary’s control, such as the terms
and conditions of employment determined by the Public Service Board (even if
there was some discretion over salaries within the agreed budget). Employment
conditions for departmental staff, whether overseas or in Australia, were the
same as those that applied to staff from all departments. Some ‘Heads of Mission’
appointments were decided by the minister — or even the Prime Minister. The
selection of deputy secretaries and first assistant secretaries, previously decided
by selection processes within the department (subject to appeal), became the
responsibility for selection panels including representatives from other
departments, as is the case elsewhere in the public service.
Following the establishment of the Office of National Assessments (ONA) in
1977, moreover, DFAT was no longer the sole arbiter and judge of assessing
political and economic developments in other countries, as they had been in the
past. Significantly, ONA reports directly to the Prime Minister but DFAT only
has input into, yet limited influence over, its assessments. Initially, ONA was
staffed by many DFAT officers on secondment and has itself only ever been
headed by former DFAT senior officers but, as time passed, many of the ex-DFAT
staff did not return. A consequence of this was that ONA gradually built up its
own, sometimes formidable, areas of expertise, which DFAT also once had but
gradually, and perceptibly, lost. Moreover, DFAT’s in-house analytical skills
were also noticeably reduced as a long-term result of the assessment responsibility
moving to ONA. Understandably, in these circumstances successive DFAT
secretaries sought to re-emphasise DFAT’s role in policy formulation, but this
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coincided with the appearance of new Australian policy implementers, such as
the Department of Education, on Australia’s international stage.
Similarly, as the public service was increasingly called on to respond to immediate
issues of the day, as global communications became more ‘instant’, longer-term
policy development that was in the 1960s and 1970s a matter of departmental
pride, also suffered, to be officially abolished in the 1990s. Instead, the
department found itself spending much larger proportion of its time and resources
on consular matters, which became a topic of much greater media interest from
the 1980s. This, along with the responsibility for passport issue (which DFAT
had taken over from the Department of Immigration in 1974), transformed the
department into much more of a service agency than an organisation focused
largely on issues of high policy.
Little attention is given in the former secretaries’ presentations to the challenges
they faced in cutting staff, yet these were among the more difficult issues they
faced throughout this period, especially as DFAT often seemed to have ‘no friend
in court’ in cabinet (or the Expenditure Review Committee) when it came to
defending the department’s budget. So decisions to cut policy planning altogether
or to expand consular and passport operations significantly were pragmatic
decisions taken by secretaries reflecting the demands of the day, under
never-ending resource pressures, and did not necessarily reflect ideal outcomes
for secretaries with strong commitments to the department.
Over the years, the consistent appointment of DFAT secretaries from within the
ranks of the department would have contributed emphatically to preservation
of the departmental professionalism, if not its former culture (this is consistent
with the practice in most other countries, where the concept of a distinct ‘foreign
service’ is also much stronger). Only two complete outsiders have been appointed
as secretary of DFAT: Stuart Harris, who had served previously as Deputy
Secretary of Trade; and, in 2004, Michael L’Estrange, who had worked in the
international division of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and
was an outside appointee as High Commissioner to the UK. This contrasts
markedly with other APS departments, where ‘outside’ appointments are much
more common. Moreover, some senior DFAT officers have been appointed heads
of other departments and agencies; this happened occasionally from the 1960s
but more frequently from the mid-1990s,6  but the reverse movement has not
happened. It is curious that in the 20 years 1987–2007, there were only two
ministers for Foreign Affairs while there have been seven secretaries of the
department. Only one secretary in these two decades, Ashton Calvert, was
appointed for a second term. Calvert was the only secretary of Foreign Affairs
since Arthur Tange (1954–65) to serve for more than five years. Other than
Tange, only Hodgson (1935–45) served for such a long term.
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Traditionally, DFAT staff had been seconded to other departments (and sometimes
the private sector, as in the case of Peter Henderson) and this broadened their
experience, helped their networking and refreshed DFAT’s own knowledge and
expertise. As career mobility generally increased, secondments tended to
disappear in the period from the mid-1980s. DFAT staff still moved to the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Prime Minister’s Office
and vice versa. In this sense, DFAT became somewhat less ‘isolated’ than before,
although in the late 1990s and thereafter this was partially compensated for by
the increase in ‘lateral recruitment’. However, even after the 1987 integration
of trade staff into the department, there were no formal staff exchanges with
Austrade and little or no mobility between the two organisations. Nor was there
ever much movement between DFAT and AusAID, even though, arguably,
development assistance expertise would be valuable in certain areas of DFAT
policy implementation.
One phenomenon of the 1970s and 1980s was the increasing number of officers
from other departments assigned to Australian missions overseas. While the
former secretaries refer to formal mechanisms that DFAT traditionally employed
and, indeed, refined, to manage the greater diversity of staff in overseas missions
and coordinate the multiple lines of reporting, they do not really address the
net result of more departments having an ‘international branch’ to which their
own overseas staff reported. Yet the practice whereby other officials, when
serving overseas, were formally seconded to DFAT, as is the case in many other
countries, was still not widely enforced. Moreover, the presence of these
representatives in Australia’s overseas missions was not always problem-free.
This change naturally complicated DFAT’s policy role, made it more difficult
for DFAT to keep track of the specialised and sometimes technical issues that
arose. Overall, as a result, DFAT’s voice in Australia’s responses to some issues
was diluted and generally its policy influence was eroded. So it is not altogether
surprising that, during this period, the concept of the ‘Australian foreign service’
was neither advocated, nor was this terminology often used. Austrade (always
under its own legislation) and some other departments would not necessarily
recognise that they were part of an Australian foreign service. For example, the
secretary of DFAT is not generally recognised, even informally, as the head of
the Australian foreign service, whereas the secretary of the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet is often perceived and treated as the de facto head
of the Australian Public Service.
While the DFAT institution is strong and the culture pervasive and enduring,
many developments that occurred during this period contributed to a dilution
of the departmental culture. Reinforcement of the departmental culture is
achieved in part through training and early career instruction. But from the
mid-1980s, DFAT stopped running its own training courses and outsourced
these to Australian universities. Even though departmental staff still acted as
9
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‘lecturers’, this meant a gradual dissipation of the departmental culture over
time. Strangely, perhaps, there was never any joint training with Austrade or
AusAID staff within the same portfolio, nor are there regular staff exchanges
with either of those agencies (although staff transfers occasionally occur as
one-off events). The 1992 Senate Committee report criticised the ‘paternalistic
management style’ with its ‘reliance on individual relationships’; the ‘closed
shop’ limiting recruitment of ‘outsiders‘ into the department; career prospects
of officers already in the department; the lack of reinvigorating mobility between
DFAT and other departments; and the ‘insular’ character of the department
which discouraged talented people from joining. While it noted the significant
improvements that had been made in most of these areas, it called on the
department ‘not to be complacent’, to ‘continue to make rigorous efforts to
improve its administration’ and to be ‘continually alert to areas of potential
regression or management failure’ (Senate conclusions 13.9 1992).
All of the secretaries whose words appear in this publication made significant
contributions to the department, but the nature of their contributions was
obviously influenced by their individual qualities and experience, and by the
circumstances in which they served. Some, such as Stuart Harris, had a greater
impact as reformers than others, but this was not necessarily the result either
of choice or natural leaning alone. Sometimes the secretaries were presented
with a reform mandate, or found themselves in a situation where the department
needed to keep pace with reform occurring in the public service around it. Some
had a high public profile in their job, others less so.
The personal backgrounds of these secretaries were quite different, although
their professional careers have some similarities. The two more ‘traditional’
diplomats, Peter Henderson and Richard Woolcott, both went to Geelong
Grammar School, while Stuart Harris was born and attended high school in the
UK. As bureaucrats, all experienced working closely with ministers and had
been exposed to political processes. Significantly, four of the five had spent the
formative years of their careers in Foreign Affairs, with a mixture of overseas
and head office experience. But three (Harris, Flood and Costello) had experience
of working in senior positions in other departments, while two (Henderson and
Woolcott) had spent their entire working careers in DFAT. Richard Woolcott
had spent more time overseas than his fellow secretaries. He had, however, spent
some years as head of the Department’s media office, giving him unusual breadth
of knowledge about the workings of the department. For all the former
secretaries, except Philip Flood, their bureaucratic careers ended with their term
as secretary; Flood was subsequently appointed Australian High Commissioner
to the UK.
By the year 2000, the department was demonstrably a more confident institution
than the one of the 1980s. Talk of the department being ‘in crisis’ or suffering
10
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‘poor morale’ had stopped as DFAT secretaries gave priority to ensuring
departmental staff gave the governments of the day what they required. For
example, DFAT had helped ensure that Australian interests remained secure in
the later 1990s notwithstanding considerable turmoil in the Australian region
(Fiji, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands) where
Australia for the first time could not depend on ‘great and powerful allies’. The
department had already produced Australia’s first foreign policy white paper
for the Howard government and was about to prepare a second version. Perhaps
more than anything else, this was a revival of both the department’s pre-eminent
role in policy-making in international affairs and an affirmation of the role of
the secretary in overseeing this process.
It is curious, however, that no history of the department has ever been written
and that three of the former secretaries in this volume are among the relatively
few senior DFAT officers who have ever written about the operations of the
Department.
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Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
1979–84
Background
The major international event over this period was the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979. Australian foreign policy was affected not only because of
the debate over sanctions leading up to the 1980 Moscow Olympics, but also
because of general concerns about expanding Soviet activities in Australia’s
nearby regions. In Asia, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979 and the flow-on
from China’s 1978 ‘open door’ policy represented different challenges and
Australia had varying success as it adjusted its policies towards Japan (embarking
on its ‘resources diplomacy’) and Indonesia (which was hyper-sensitive about
internal stability).
Before taking up his appointment as secretary of the Department, Peter Henderson
had a distinguished diplomatic career in Australia and overseas. But it was as a
very experienced manager in the department that he had made his mark and he
was always considered to be a prime candidate for the secretaryship. Writing
about his appointment, one authoritative commentator noted that he ‘brought
to his task a capacity for hard work, considerable experience of in-house
administration and a warm, sensitive, even democratic personality’.1 These
qualities were needed as the Department coped with internal morale problems,
caused partly by budget cuts that affected it more than other departments, and
increased challenges to its professionalism.
These years were also notable for the beginning of new dynamics affecting
Australian foreign policy-making processes in Canberra. On the one hand, Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser continued to be an activist in the field of diplomacy,
often demonstrating a distinctive and innovative approach, and the Office of
National Assessments was set up to report directly to him which, to some extent,
diminished the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Second, several outside
reports on Australia’s international relations had been commissioned by the
Australian Government around this time implying some loss of confidence in
traditional policy-making processes. These included the report on Australia’s
Relations with the Third World, by Professor Owen Harries (1980) and the Report
on Australia’s Relations with Japan by Baillieu Myer (1978). Thirdly, the
Australian parliament displayed greater interest in Australia’s international
relationships, producing several reports from the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee (such as its 1980 report on Australia’s Relations with ASEAN) whose
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recommendations tended to go beyond current government policies. Finally,
after the Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1982, Australian journalists
were emboldened to write more critically about foreign policy. These were
challenging times.
Peter Henderson published his 1986 autobiography Privilege and Pleasure
(Methuen Haynes, 1986).
Henderson Presentation: 25 May 2006
I have been asked to speak about my role as secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs. That was from 1979 to 1984, before the amalgamation with the
Department of Trade. My talk focuses on what the job entailed and how I
approached it, not on particular policy issues, or on Australia’s external
relationships, or on the political context of the day.2
One other thing before I go further. I must remind you it is now over 20 years
— or two decades to use that fashionable and overworked word — since I was
secretary. That is a very long time: a whole generation. I emphasise this for two
reasons. My memory of the details of the events which took place over 20 years
ago is now a bit porous. And if at times I sound somewhat out of date, I am.
A friend of mine has described the job like this:
• Responsible under the minister and cabinet for framing and implementation
of foreign policy, bilateral and multilateral.
• Responsible for day-to-day management of a large institution with a mobile
and diverse membership.
If that describes the job, how did I go about it? Let me begin with the ministerial
and parliamentary, responsibilities. I shall go on later to the responsibilities of
the day-to-day management of the department as an institution.
There are, I believe, two major determinants in the role that any departmental
secretary plays in relation to the minister and the Government. First, there is
the nature and personality of the secretary himself, shaped largely by his previous
career experience and his general outlook and attitude of mind. Second, there
is the minister of the day, his outlook and expectations. And overarching both,
of course, is the key question of whether the minister and the secretary can
develop a successful working relationship.
So how did I become secretary? And having been appointed, what did I actually
do in the job? It is easy enough to answer the first question. It is very hard not
to be long-winded in answering the second.
I became secretary because I was tapped on the shoulder for it. There was no
application, no interview, no requirement to provide some sort of policy
statement beforehand, no fixed term. My appointment, like others before it,
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came about as a result of consultation between the prime minister (Malcolm
Fraser) and the minister (Andrew Peacock). Who else they consulted I simply
do not know.3
In my case I had the advantage — at least I suppose it was an advantage — of
being a known quantity to both of them: I had acted in the job for some seven
months at different intervals over the preceding three years, first after Alan
Renouf left and again after Nick Parkinson’s departure.4  It has been suggested
to me that I was appointed because I was Sir Robert Menzies’ son-in-law. I do
not think the family relationship was a factor on this occasion.
I referred a moment ago to a public policy statement, or rather the lack of it.
This did not mean that I had no idea of what I wanted to do as secretary. And
what I wanted to do was in many respects the outcome of what I had seen and
done in the department over the preceding 28 years. Careers were and, I suppose
still are, very much governed by chance: what posts you are sent to, what jobs
you are given in Canberra, how long you stay in any one assignment, health,
family problems and so on.
In my case my general approach was influenced very heavily by the
three-and-a-half years I had spent as a First Secretary in the personnel and
administrative division of the department. Then, later on, I was First Assistant
Secretary, Management Services and later again a deputy with some management
and personnel responsibilities. I did not choose that career path. It just happened.
Indeed, at one stage I was so depressed about the way I seemed to have been
typecast that I applied for a transfer to the Defence Department. But I was much
cheered to come back from London in 1970 and to be put in charge of the South
and South East Asia Branch. I found it much more enlivening and more of a
challenge, to be drafting a message from Mr Whitlam to Washington about
Vietnam, than yet another long statement for the secretary to be sent to a
promotions appeal committee at the Public Service Board.
Naturally, and this must be true of anyone appointed secretary from within the
Department, I was also very much influenced by my perceptions of how my
predecessors had handled the job. I had worked closely with some of them.
There were, to my mind, a number of lessons to be drawn — examples to be
followed, examples not to be followed. For example, I had seen at first hand the
benefits to individual officers if the secretary took a painstaking approach to
individual career aspirations and problems, and to be accessible to staff. I had
also seen what happened if the paper was not kept moving and filing cabinets
were stuffed higgledy-piggledy with files needing decisions. I had also noted
the consequences of the secretary making no real effort to work with, or for the
Department to be accepted by, the rest of the Commonwealth public service.
High on the lists of the fields of activity where one tried to learn from observing
the behaviour of one’s predecessors was the question of the relationship to be
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established with the minister. The record was, on the whole, a daunting one.
There were a number of known, or suspected, cases of extreme difficulty. Senior
officers had for years given us spine-chilling accounts of confrontations with
Dr Evatt,5  but he was not the only one. In some instances we had to wait for
many years to know what actually happened. One recent example is Peter
Edwards’ account in his book published only a few months ago of Sir Arthur
Tange’s treatment by Sir Paul Hasluck.6
The actual circumstances varied in every case, depending on the pressure of
events at the time and on individual personalities. There is no golden mean that
I know of, no commonly accepted way, for a minister and a secretary to proceed.
It is a testing relationship which has to be worked out from scratch each time
by two often very different people.
Looking at the issue from the point of view of the secretary, there are — and
have been in government departments over the years — various patterns of
behaviour. At one extreme there have been those secretaries who have sought
to cling leech-like to the minister and to establish themselves as the only
substantial source of advice, to be constantly at the minister’s elbow and to
discourage contact between the minister and other officers of the department.
At the other extreme there have been those secretaries who have risked giving
the minister the impression of deliberately keeping their distance, even perhaps
talking down to him, and that they have their own distinct and unassailable
power base. A bit like Sir Humphrey Appleby perhaps in Yes Minister. Most of
us, though, probably came down somewhere in the middle.
The relationship between the minister, the secretary and the department is a
three-way one — and in many cases as difficult as the classic eternal triangle.
The initiative in handling it, in my view, should lie with the secretary. It is
really up to the secretary to decide how he wants to present the department to
the minister. I believed very firmly that, in most instances, I should encourage
the minister to deal direct with senior officers on specific policy issues, especially
those of particular complexity. If we had an expert on Japan, say, I thought it
would be a waste of time for that officer to brief me and then for me to brief the
minister. I thought the minister would be much better served by having direct
contact with that officer and to be able to ask questions, to have a dialogue.
There were, of course, one or two angles to this. First, it was a deliberate act of
delegation on my part intended to facilitate expeditious and effective handling
of issues and to avoid bottlenecks. Second, it represented a deliberate expression
of confidence on my part in the competence of individual officers, that I trusted
them to have direct ministerial access, oral and written. I knew it would be on
my head if any of them botched it. Although this did happen once or twice, it
was a risk that, with most senior officers, I had little hesitation in taking. I also
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hoped that individual senior officers would respond positively to my
demonstration of confidence in them.
Perhaps the best way of describing how I wanted the minister to see me in
relation to the department — and I know this is a hackneyed analogy but I
cannot think of a better one — was as the conductor of an orchestra playing for
his benefit. I could not reasonably be expected to play every individual
instrument with the skill of a professional player but I was responsible for the
orchestra playing together and in tune.
But, if the minister’s dealings were in many cases with senior officers, where
did this leave me, as secretary? The answer, partly, lay in the arrangements I
made within the department for making my own input to what was going on.
I did this in various ways. To begin with I had regular morning meetings with
a small group of senior officers. There the current and contentious issues were
discussed. Then, time permitting, I discussed with individual senior officers by
themselves, or accompanied by their own immediate offsiders, their major draft
submissions to the minister. On major issues I would sign those submissions
myself. I always saw drop copies of all ministerial submissions the day they were
sent. If I thought it desirable I could always follow them up with the minister
personally, either by seeing him or ringing him up, but it was rarely easy to
make quick personal contact with most of the ministers I worked for. I return
to this in a moment.
Then there was the daily intake of telegrams from overseas posts. The handling
of telegrams has always been a major problem for any secretary. It certainly was
for me. Every morning there was an enormous bundle of them, sometimes a foot
or more high. I had a devoted assistant who used to come in very early and go
through them all for me, picking out the ones she thought I should read, or at
least be aware of. I felt I had to deal with the telegrams before the office opened
properly at 8.30am. There was always the possibility of an early call about one
of them from the minister or from the head of another department, say Prime
Minister’s or Defence, both of whom were early risers. And then, of course,
there were the subsequent deliveries of cables during the day as well as the
outward telegrams to be read, not all of them necessarily originating in Foreign
Affairs.
There are two relevant points to be made. The first is that reading the telegrams
was yet another and very important way of keeping up with events. The second
is that the actual process of reading so much so quickly was a constant and severe
physical strain. The reason Nick Parkinson had to retire as secretary was the
damage being done to his eyes from having to undertake so much unavoidable
reading, especially telegrams. In the end, he was told in mid-year that, if he kept
that reading up, he would be too blind by Christmas to drive the car. Once he
had left the job, his eye condition stabilised.
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While I believed at the time that the arrangements I had made were the most
effective I could devise to meet the minister’s and the department’s normal and
regular working requirements, I have sometimes wondered since whether I
should not have tried to be seen to be making more of a fuss of the ministers I
worked for — to have been more conspicuously active in doing their bidding.
One practical problem, in regard to some ministers, was the difficulty of seeing
them or securing an appointment, or even to talk on the telephone. In my day,
especially when Parliament was sitting, ministers usually spent only three days
of the week in Canberra. Often they found it impossible to spare time for
appointments.
One quite common result was for me to spend a whole Monday or a Friday
travelling interstate to see the minister on his home ground. If the minister was
spending the week at home anyway, I had no problem, but I used to find it
galling, when I knew the minister was coming to Canberra the following day or
had flown home from Canberra on the afternoon of the previous day, to spend
the whole day away from the office simply to have an hour or so, or even less,
with him. And the expense to the taxpayer seemed unwarranted.
Relations with the minister could also be complicated by relations with the Prime
Minister. Nick Parkinson told a meeting of the Australian Institute of
International Affairs in Brisbane in 1992 how he was once rung by Prime Minister
Fraser and asked a few questions, to which he gave the best answers he could.
Shortly afterwards he was rung by an angry Mr Peacock asking him what he
meant by going behind his back to the Prime Minister. I had similar problems
on the home front.
One area of personal contact, both with the Prime Minister and the minister,
was accompanying either or both on official trips overseas. In relation to prime
ministerial visits, I often used to think of that wartime slogan: ‘Is your journey
really necessary?’ There were times when I felt the departmental secretaries
were there mainly for the sake of appearances and in case something happened
that made us needed. On the other hand, the work of the prime ministerial
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, specially in the communiqué
committee, was unremitting. All night sessions were common.
I have spoken of the secretary’s role in relation to the Prime Minister and the
minister. I now want to turn to Parliament. When Parliament was in session one
of the daily tasks was to keep up to date for the minister the big file of draft
answers to possible parliamentary questions (PPQs). The possible questions, and
the proposed answers, had to be up-to-the-minute in content and over in




Often the answers amounted to brief and authoritative statements of Australian
policy. It was here that I felt the secretary had an important role to play: to know
what the minister had been told in previous PPQs and to be sure that the new
formulations were accurate and succinct. Therefore, every day, or perhaps more
accurately, every evening, I would go though the PPQs before they were sent
across to Parliament House. I would, of course, be given the new ones, or the
revisions, separately from the others already on file, but even so it was a
time-consuming task. Often we had to make last-minute amendments because
of some telegram that had just come in. There could be a real scramble under
extreme pressure.
At times the secretary’s role was to attend sessions of parliamentary committees
and to answer questions. There were periods when ministers forbade their
secretaries to attend those sessions, on the grounds that the secretaries could be
seen as usurping ministers’ roles in making and giving public expression to,
matters of policy. At other times, the Opposition used the sessions to attack
ministers through their private secretaries and other senior staff. That could be
very uncomfortable. The discomfort was increased when the sessions were open
to the press.
Another of the secretary’s responsibilities, deriving mainly from the minister,
was for relations with the Diplomatic Corps in Canberra. When a new head of
mission arrived in Canberra, he or she presented credentials to the
Governor-General at a formal ceremony at Yarralumla. There was provision in
the order of proceedings for attendance by the minister. In practice, ministers
very rarely went. That meant my getting dressed up in a morning suit and going
to Yarralumla for an hour or two, often at the busiest time of day. Heads of
Mission also expected the secretary to attend their national day receptions and
to accept dinner and cocktail party invitations particularly when, as often
occurred, ministers were unwilling or unable to accept invitations themselves.
I used to try to go to each diplomatic mission for dinner once a year. But that,
coupled with the practice I had inherited of giving a formal farewell lunch in
the department to every departing ambassador or high commissioner, plus the
presentations, all took up scarce time. I did, though, have plenty of practice at
making cheery little lunch and dinner party speeches for foreign diplomats.
Those speeches would have been harder if I had not tried to establish good
personal working relationships with the heads of mission themselves.
Our ministers have not been the first to shuffle off the corps. In 1900, Lord
Salisbury delegated the work to a junior minister, telling Queen Victoria that
‘many more ambassadorial afternoons would certainly shorten his life’. The same
ministers, of course, often expect their representatives overseas to have instant




I should like to turn now to the second half of the responsibilities I outlined at
the beginning of this talk: the day-to-day management of the department as a
large institution with a mobile and diverse membership. By and large, with the
exception of the appointment of heads of mission overseas and the filling of very
senior positions in Canberra, this did not involve most ministers.
Two headings come at once to mind: structure and staffing.
The structure of the department and of its overseas posts was the outcome of
consultations with, and directives by, the Commonwealth Public Service Board.
By this I mean the number of established positions and the salary scales applying
to these positions, both at home and overseas. In addition the Board set allowance
scales intended, theoretically, to cover the cost of living at overseas posts, such
things as the education of children, the rental of living accommodation, excess
medical expenses, etc. There was a system in force of regular Public Service
Board (PSB) inspections of overseas posts as a preliminary to setting local
allowances for each post. I use the word ‘theoretically’ advisedly. Things may
be different and better now, but in my day the inequalities and vagaries of the
allowance ‘system’ were notorious and most departmental officers had their
favourite story about some PSB inspector who had little if any idea and did not
seem to want to find out, what was involved in living and working in foreign
countries. My favourite was the inspector who, after examining how we all lived
and tried to make ends meet in Jakarta in 1956, stepped on the plane saying: ‘I
would never bring my wife to live here’.
If the Department believed an increase in staff was needed, whether for a section
in Canberra or for an overseas post, it had first to convince the Board that a new
position at a certain salary should be approved. Likewise, if allowances were
thought to be inadequate anywhere in the world, the department had to take
up the case with the Board. As you can imagine, these were laborious and
time-consuming procedures.
The Board also had a key role to play in relation to departmental recruitment
and departmental promotions. Again the actual procedures were laborious and
time-consuming.
I mention all this about the Board simply to drive home the point that, when it
came to managing the department and to establishing conditions of employment,
the secretary was not the master of his own household. In later years, after I had
left the public service and had in-depth contact with some major Australian
companies, I used to reflect ruefully on the difference in circumstances between
the limitations on me, as the head of a government department, and the freedom
of action enjoyed by the chief executives of big commercial enterprises.
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Against this background how did I deal with the personnel issues, with
individual people and their conditions of employment? What were the major
staffing and personnel issues facing me in 1979?
The biggest issue facing me, setting aside for the moment the conditions of
service overseas, was how to begin bridging the gulf between the political staff
of the department on one hand and the staff of the consular and administrative
service on the other. The two career streams were quite separate and distinct,
beginning with different recruitment procedures. The political staff were selected
from university graduates on the basis of exhaustive selection procedures
conducted in conjunction with the Public Service Board. The consular and
administrative staff were clerical officers of the Commonwealth public service.
The political staff could aspire to Second Division positions in the department
in Canberra and to head of mission appointments overseas. There were no Second
Division positions for the consular and administrative staff and none, as far as
I knew, had ever been appointed a head of mission or a consul-general.
Some members of the political staff let their feelings of superiority show in a
less than heart-warming way. Many of the consular and administrative staff
exhibited varying degrees of resentment and ill-feeling. I strongly believed that
this gulf should be bridged, that all members of the department had to feel they
were members of the one team and that there should be no structural limitations
on the advancement of competent people whichever section of the department
they had begun their career in.
Now is not the place, nor is there time, to embark on a detailed account of steps
taken by me in this area. Suffice it to say, though, that by the time I had left,
some discernable progress had been made. Members of the consular and
administrative service had reached the Second Division, had become Head of
Mission and had become Consul General.
A related issue was the thorny question of lateral recruitment to the political
side of the department. I did not like the idea of the department being a closed
shop, or being criticised for it. I did not see why talented people who had not
happened to be recruited at the usual age but who were keen to join and had
something valuable to offer could not be brought in at middle or senior levels.
This was particularly so when the person or people in question were already
members of the Commonwealth public service.
The other side of the coin was that I felt it would be a good thing to promote
the interchange of officers with some other government departments. It could
broaden our outlook and theirs. I extended this also to having a limited exchange
of staff with big Australian companies. I had valued my own six months
secondment to (the Australian resources company) CRA, as it then was, and
wanted to make it possible for others to have similar experience.
21
Peter Henderson, AC
The prospect of even very limited lateral recruitment, which I believed I
eventually achieved, aroused strong feelings amongst some of the political officers
in the department who feared their career prospects were being threatened.
Again, I cannot remember the details of how it went, but I do remember myself
as acting secretary in 1977 when lateral recruitment was, I think, already an
issue, microphone in hand, addressing a large lunchtime meeting outside the
department. As I looked at the photograph in The Canberra Times next morning,
I wondered if I had not crossed the borderline to becoming a politician.
Another group issue was the position of women in the department. Until the
1960s, Foreign Affairs, like all other departments, had been hamstrung by the
Public Service Act requirement that female officers should resign on marriage.
This meant that, by 1979, despite recruiting women graduates every year, the
department was still suffering from the unsought loss of many members of a
whole generation of female recruits — roughly from 1945–65. The reason why
we had comparatively few senior female officers in 1979 was not prejudice
against women, as the press and other critics tended to assert, but because so
many good ones had, so to speak, ‘gone missing’. With the passage of time and
the continued recruitment of women graduates the gap has, I believe, now been
filled. In 1979 it was a public issue which held no possibility of quick solution.
Before turning from groups to individuals I want to acknowledge the role played
by a different but very important group of women, the secretarial staff of the
Department. Both in Canberra and overseas much depended on their competence
and good humour. Often they had to contend with very difficult places to live
and work. Most did so uncomplainingly and made notable contributions to the
department. As secretary I had regular contact with the head of that group.
I move now to individual staffing matters. I had to spend a considerable amount
of time on making head of mission recommendations to the minister; on overseas
posting decisions for other staff; on promotions and placements of all staff,
specially at the more senior level; and on the recruitment of graduate staff. To
do all this properly, I felt I should know personally as many as possible of those
concerned.
The position was complicated by so many people serving overseas for so much
of the time. So I instituted a system of having short personal interviews with all
staff, both political and consular and administrative, from very senior down to
about First Secretary or Class 8, either going to or coming back from a posting.
I felt that, given the nature of the Foreign Service, individuals had a justifiable
expectation of some personal exchange with the boss, even if it lasted no longer
than 15 or 20 minutes and occurred only every three or four years. It also gave
individuals an opportunity, if they wanted, to get matters of great personal
importance to them off their chests to me, and it was invaluable background for
me in the decisions I had to make about them.
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There were also one or two people who have been mentioned by Sir Edward
Woodward, the former Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO), in his recent autobiography, One Brief Moment.7  Of
Australian representatives abroad who were homosexual. Sir Edward wrote:
I helped Peter with one difficult area of his responsibility … On at least
two occasions I interviewed the officers concerned and said that their
security clearances were not at risk, provided they were open with us
about their sexual preferences and they reported immediately any
attempted blackmail. This was our concern, because a person who was
in denial was very vulnerable. Peter made the final decision, but I was
happy to back and reinforce his views in those cases where he judged
the risk to be minimal.
The exercise of that responsibility, thankfully, did not come my way very often.
How many failures did I have in my attempts to get on terms with the staff of
the department? I shall never know the answer to that question. There are two
people, though, who come immediately to mind: the head of mission who brought
a tape recorder with him to a private meeting between the two of us, saying he
did not trust me to stick to what I told him; and the officer who refused to shake
my hand when he came for a farewell call. Others, I know, have borne lasting
resentment for my carrying out instructions from the minister affecting them
and their careers. It was not simply, as I think they supposed, whether I believed,
or did not believe, what they had told me, or whether I had failed to defend
them effectively. I was not the one who had the last say.
One last area of responsibility I should like to mention briefly is relations with
other departments and government bodies. As well as Foreign Affairs, there
were two organisations responsible to our minister — the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Australian Development Assistance Bureau
(ADAB). I found it important to have regular and effective contact with the
heads of both. Then, in its own special category of proximity, there was the
Public Service Board. There follow the major departments of state: Prime Minister
and Cabinet, Defence, Trade, Treasury and Immigration. At the personal level,
I believed I should try to get on well with my counterparts in those departments
even when there were differences in view and outlook on matters under
discussion.
The reasons for some problems with the Board have already been mentioned.
Another factor in our relations with the Board and with other departments, was
the widespread recollection of Alan Renouf’s very public, but unsuccessful,
attempts in the mid-seventies to have a separate foreign service act, like the
Trade Commissioners Act, and broadly to allow Foreign Affairs to run itself. In
many ways it was a logical and commendable objective but it was just not
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practical politics. But as a result of the attempt I was well aware that, in the eyes
of many of my counterparts, Foreign Affairs could get above itself and needed
sitting on.
Problems occurred with the Department of Trade from time to time, largely I
think because of the differences between the Liberals and the Country Party
within the Coalition when it was in power. I can remember only one major falling
out with Jim Scully when he was secretary of Trade. I thought that Australian
exporters would benefit from advice on local political factors within their target
countries, especially in South East Asia, and that their executives would find it
useful to call on heads of mission as well as trade representatives when they
visited those countries and for heads of mission visiting Australia to call on
them. Jim misconstrued this and thought that, in approaching individual
companies, the department was trying to horn in on areas that belonged to Trade.
The subsequent amalgamation between Foreign Affairs and Trade will have
resolved that kind of difficulty, I hope.
In relation to Defence, there was a formal requirement for the secretary to
represent the department at meetings of the Defence Committee. The Committee,
which also included Treasury and Prime Minister and Cabinet, had very
wide-ranging responsibilities to present policy options to ministers. Contrary
to the impression of one or two ministers, the Committee’s role was not to make
policy, which would have been to usurp the role of ministers. I have been told
that these ministerial views led later to the Committee being disbanded.
I have spoken of the role of the secretary in relation to the minister, Parliament,
departmental staff and other departments. I have said nothing about the press.
This has not been a deliberate omission but has come about because in my day,
although I have had interviews with individual journalists from time to time,
the regular contact with the press was undertaken first and foremost by ministers,
who regarded it as their prerogative, and then on a lower level by the
departmental Press Officer. Personally I never felt at ease with most members
of the press. On one occasion, Michelle Grattan8  rang me up at about 11 o’clock
at night in Washington after I had had a very good and very liquid dinner with
Nick Parkinson, then Australian ambassador there, to check some abstruse point
on policy towards Cambodia. I still vividly remember agonising for the next few
days over every Australian press summary from Canberra. Fortunately, I had
got it right. But on that and many other occasions of press contact I never felt
really comfortable.
So now, to conclude, I hope I have given you some idea of what I did and what
I tried to do and some of the major difficulties I faced, in terms of running the
department. It was a stimulating challenge that lasted five years most of which
I enjoyed. I have always been glad I had the opportunity of taking it on.
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I just wished at the time, though, that like Mrs Thatcher and Mrs Marcos at
their much more elevated levels, I could get by on four hours sleep a night.
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Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
1984–87, and Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, 1987–88
Background
Stuart Harris was secretary through a time of considerable upheaval in the
Australian Public Service: changes that also had a major direct impact on the
Department of Foreign Affairs. From 1983, the Hawke Government instituted
major reforms to the Canberra bureaucracy seeking to make it more performance
oriented, better focused on client service and, generally, more efficient and
effective. As secretary, Harris was determined to introduce these reforms into
the department on the grounds that it could not remain aloof from such changes
as it might have in the past.
The second upheaval resulted from the 1987 changes to the Administrative
Arrangements that saw the Department of Trade broken up and all its external
components brought into Foreign Affairs and renamed the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade. As a former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Trade,
Harris was well placed to oversee this transition, but the pressures that this
generated cannot be underestimated. Eventually, this reform was regarded as a
considerable managerial triumph and was emulated by some other foreign
ministries. The reforms changed the culture of DFAT for at least the next two
decades. Despite the ‘pain’ of absorbing budget cuts consistently over many
years (often more than other departments in Canberra), the 1987 changes left
the Department ‘competitive’ with its overseas counterparts.
Internationally, these were times of unusually rapid political, economic and
technological change. Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms in the Soviet Union, the
growing success of China’s ‘open door’ policies and transforming economic
growth in the other ‘newly industrialising countries’ of East Asia, all had some
impact on Australia. Managing Australia’s alliance with the United States as the
differences emerged between the relatively new progressive Labor Government
in Canberra and a conservative administration in Washington, represented a
particular challenge for the Department.
Australian diplomacy had to adjust to an increasingly globalised world, where
issues were inter-related and where managing the implications of technological
change confronted governments everywhere with difficult choices. While he
was the first non-career diplomat to head Foreign Affairs in forty years,1  as an
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economist, Harris was comfortable dealing with economic aspects of international
relations that were increasingly impinging on traditional foreign policy concerns.
Stuart Harris was the author of the Review of Australia’s Overseas Representation
in 1985. Since his retirement as secretary, he returned to The Australian National
University where he has written extensively about international affairs.
Harris Presentation 8 August 2006
On my first day at what was then the Department of Foreign Affairs, I naturally
wondered, as one does, what aspect of Australia’s role in changing the world,
bringing about peace or at least stopping World War Three, I would be involved
in as secretary of the Department.
Well, as it happened, on my first day I was involved in averting a potential
lock-out by the union because of a dispute over asbestos found in some plumbing
refurbishment in the basement of the Foreign Affairs building. My first
instruction from the minister a day or two later was to stop the leaks of
confidential cables to the press. My second ministerial instruction was to put
an end to the queues outside the Sydney passport office that were featuring
graphically in Sydney newspapers. I am pleased to say success was achieved in
each case — but, although it had stood me in good stead, I did not expect what
I thought of as my considerable experience in international negotiations —
bilateral as well as multilateral — under J. G. Crawford and successive ministers
including John McEwen and Doug Anthony, to be brought into play in this
way.
The passport office exercise was an interesting one, in that Prime Minister Hawke
subsequently brought in a consultant to improve governmental efficiency and
his approach was, as is the approach of efficiency experts, to reverse whatever
was in place. In this case, this meant undoing the changes we had made
successfully to improve the operations of the Sydney office. We simply pretended
to follow his instructions — and while I was not yet ready to lie for my country,
I could at least lie for my new department.
Those experiences illustrate a point Peter Henderson made in his presentation
— that being head of Foreign Affairs was substantially an administrative task
and, particularly, one of managing the diplomatic network. I will refer to some
of the administrative changes that I introduced as secretary — some of which
have stayed, some not.
I was, of course, an outsider appointed to head the department, but I was given
loyal support from most in the department and exceptional support from some,
particularly Geoff Miller and Mike Costello and later David Sadleir.2  I was
appointed, partly, I imagine, because of the Government’s interest in a greater
economic focus; partly, again, because when I left the Trade Department, where
I had been a deputy secretary, and went to The Australian National University,
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I had been talking about the implications for Australia’s governance of global
changes that later came to be called globalisation. This seemed to me to have
substantial implications for the way we operated in the world, not only in
economic but also in political and security contexts.
In that context I had pointed to the logic of combining the trade and foreign
affairs departments, provided internal policy debate remained strong. I was
concerned, however, about the potential risk this created for suppressing internal
debate within a combined department — as I still am.
Globalisation had, and still has, a great many consequences. Foreign relations
were increasingly fragmented and diffused. The communication changes, for
one, meant that the information process became much more open, with the media
and elements of civil society (NGOs) often ahead of formal intra-government
reporting. The ‘bean-counters’, in their unwisdom, saw the CNN factor implying
a reduced role for the department — and therefore argued that we needed fewer
resources. In practice, the department needed more resources to be able to analyse
CNN-type reports — to confirm, to elaborate, to interpret and to respond — for
the government. Growth in travel — by tourists, representatives of business
and various non-governmental actors — also had an impact on Australia’s foreign
relations. This, together with the growing complexity of foreign relationships,
put added demands not only on the head office in Canberra, but especially on
its overseas representatives, who needed, particularly, to deepen their
understanding of what was happening in their areas of responsibility.
Environmental issues were becoming more salient (whales, Antarctica) as were
human rights, and some bad phenomena were emerging, including diseases and
crime, not all of which were as evident as they have since become, but were
prevalent enough even then to need greater attention.
It was evident that, in managing international interdependence, policy-makers
needed to operate in a wider variety of contexts, to link up more with other
governmental and non-governmental actors and to respond to growing public
interest in international issues. All of this was to have significant implications
for foreign policy coherence. The reality was that a growing number of
departments had international connections. Increasingly the gap between
domestic and international policies was diminishing and would continue to do
so. Many more departments had international units — desirably so — but this
increased the importance of having a coherent international voice.
Part of the consequence of the increased competitive environment of globalisation
was that Australia needed to speak with one voice — something it often did not
do — and it was by no means just trade and foreign affairs that was involved.
That was something that John Menadue, then head of Trade, and I sorted out
quite amicably, as was to be the case later with Primary Industry with the help
of the secretary there, Graeme Evans, and the minister, John Kerin. But, more
29
Stuart Harris, AO
generally, I resuscitated and renegotiated the Prime Minister’s Directive to
Australian Heads of Mission which affirmed the overriding responsibility of the
Australian Ambassador as the senior governmental representative of Australia
in any country.3 That seemed to work well at the time and I assume that it is
still in place.
I was asked by my minister, Bill Hayden, to undertake a review of the foreign
service which the government had made a commitment to carry out. Although
this would represent number ten, or so, of reviews of various aspects of the
foreign service in recent years — usually designed to cut staff numbers — I
took it seriously — as did the many departmental officers who helped me. The
review tried to set out how, in the new international circumstances, foreign
representation should operate efficiently and what that meant for overseas
representation generally. Looking at it again recently, I was surprised at how
well it stood up. It made a lot of recommendations based on the expectation —
which I think has been borne out, and contrary to the superficial views of a lot
of commentators — that globalisation would increase the demands on the external
departments and not reduce them.4
The Minister for Finance at the last minute indicated to Hayden that he wanted
the review to show where substantial cuts could be made. So that is what the
review did, but it also showed what the consequences of any cuts would be.
One of those has, in my view, become even more important — our increasing
dependence on analyses and information provided from overseas by those whose
interests often differ substantially from those of Australia.
I am second to none in my admiration for many aspects of the American system
and society, but when the alliance is lauded for our access to US intelligence,
one does wonder what this means when the intelligence was so wrong in guiding
the decisions on the invasion of Iraq and subsequently.
We also assume, without critical thought, when we talk about sharing common
values — and not just with the United States — that, when articulated, we
attribute the same meanings for those values such as freedom and democracy.
Yet such terms have gone beyond shared ideals to become ideological terms in
the approach of political groups such as the neo-conservatives; they have been
de-linked from reality, their meaning defined and simplified, imbued with
absolute truth and pursued with passion.
My role in administering the department was a major one. Some changes that I
thought important included more equity and transparency in promotions of
personnel, re-establishing a critical policy planning process, increasing interaction
with academics; introducing a policy roundtable mechanism for and by junior
staff, and initiating a system whereby those in disagreement with a line being
recommended to the minister by the Department could question it and, if
necessary, have the alternative referred to the minister (it was never necessary
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to do so, but it helped to stop leaks) and supporting the independence of what
is now AusAID and was then the Australian International Development Assistance
Bureau (AIDAB). But administration was not my only function, so let me talk
briefly about some of the substantive issues of the day.
In my time, the Prime Minister and (the Foreign Minister) Mr Hayden5  had
different interests and accepted that each would take the running in their own
areas of interest in what was, nevertheless, and despite the recent history,6  a
professional and cooperative relationship. Thus the Prime Minister was
particularly concerned, but not exclusively, with the United States, China, the
Middle East, the Commonwealth and the South Pacific and also with international
trade; Hayden was concerned with arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament, the United Nations and Southeast Asia, especially Indo-China. A
particular role I had was to respond to the concerns of both in order to heighten
Australia’s economic priorities and to give overseas representation a more
commercial focus.
Before joining the department I had been closely involved in the Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation process with colleagues from the ANU, including Sir John
Crawford and Dr Peter Drysdale in such developments as the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (or PECC). Although the process had an ostensibly economic
focus, it also had a large security overhang. In that context, Saburo Okita, the
one-time Japanese foreign minister and I had discussed on several occasions the
need for an official institutional process to follow up on the kinds of conclusions
being reached in PECC. Discussions in Canberra took this further to become the
embryo of the APEC proposal floated by Hawke in Korea shortly after I left the
department.
My contact with Bob Hawke had begun when I was head of what is now the
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (or ABARE), then
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (or BAE). As head of the Australian Council
of Trade Unions (ACTU), Hawke would ask for information to use in his annual
basic wage cases. He was similarly concerned about Australia’s slow reaction to
global change. As head of the department, I would travel more with Hawke than
with Hayden in order to maintain the communication link between the two
when the Prime Minister was travelling. As part of the process of delegation of
responsibility to Division Heads that I had introduced in the department, it was
more appropriate that Mr Hayden, when travelling, should have with him the
subject or area specialists, usually those responsible for the relevant geographic
area.
I was involved therefore with the international aspects of the government’s
reform program, including moves to make Australia more market-oriented and
the further development of relations with China, an interest of mine since my
first official visit there in 1973. I was also concerned to raise the level of policy
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attention to Northeast Asia where I considered most of our future economic
prospects — and our political interests — lay.
That I was more closely linked to the issues in which the Prime Minister involved
himself was also partly a consequence of my previous background of international
negotiations with multilateral institutions — such as the GATT, UNCTAD7  and
various other UN groups and in the regional cooperation processes; it was also
because Mr. Hayden was a hands-on minister who was very involved and
knowledgeable on the issues in which he was particularly interested and my
direct and detailed involvement was less necessary.
The government at the time was multilaterally-oriented. This reflected the trend
that, with globalisation, issues increasingly needed to be dealt with collectively
in the international sphere — fewer and fewer issues could be dealt with by a
country acting alone. Moreover, even where there was a choice, as with trade
relations, economic analysis points to the greater protection for smaller countries
in multilateral measures than in bilateral measures. The need for this is greater
now than ever, which is why the current difficulties with the Doha Round are
disturbing.
There was also an economic rationality bias among the ministers involved in
international issues, not just the Trade and Foreign Ministers, but also including
others such as the Treasurer, Finance Minister and the agriculture and resources
ministers. The Prime Minister was particularly active in foreign policy, always
wanting extensive briefing — which he read and remembered. He also held
strong views that at times led to vigorous — indeed robust — argument in which
you were expected to hold your own.
This was an interesting and important period of major change in Australia. The
government’s reform program was helped in practice by the support of the
Opposition that made the reform program a largely bi-partisan one. In its first
major step, the government freed up the exchange rate. More broadly, it moved
away from what the journalist Paul Kelly referred to as ‘the Australian
Settlement’: centralised wage setting, protection of industry, state paternalism
and immigration.8 The reforms opened up substantial opportunities generally
and had significant international ramifications, most notably in the international
trade context.
It was also a significant time internationally as, among other things, the Cold
War moved to its close. Having closely followed developments in the Soviet
Union for some time, I had given a conference paper talk in 1986, cleared with
Hayden, saying Gorbachev should be taken seriously. This attracted strong
criticism from the media and from some in Defence. It was a view, however, that
Hawke took with him when we went to Moscow in 1987, despite criticism from
the Opposition. We were eventually proved right.
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Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were involved in different
aspects of Australia’s relationship with the United States. This was a time of
suspicion and concern in Australia over the Reagan administration’s attitude to
nuclear war. The relationship became important for me in respect of the testing
of MX missiles and especially in handling communications between the New
Zealanders and Australia when New Zealand disengaged from the ANZUS treaty.9
Despite some adverse implications for us, in practice our alliance value increased.
But although the New Zealanders did not make it easy for us, it was important
not to dump on the New Zealanders as there was no doubt a lot of public
sympathy in Australia for the little guy, given the wide perception that the
United States had over-reacted.
Other aspects of ANZUS were the regular meetings of defence and foreign
ministers that, although symbolically important, were too formulaic to be very
useful and would have gained from greater preparation and discussion rather
than as the set pieces that usually eventuated. And yet, this was also a time when
Australia had its own strong views on China and on the Asia-Pacific region.
Perhaps surprisingly, the State Department in the Reagan Administration listened
to and, indeed, sought, Australia’s views on those issues. The State Department’s
Asian team under Secretary of State George Shultz and Gaston Sigur — and in
the White House, among them Jim Kelly — was particularly strong.10
Even so, the US administration was singularly uninterested in our views on
nuclear test bans. They were also unreceptive, moreover, when in the face of
aggressive subsidised US competition consciously targeting Australia’s
agricultural markets in Asia and elsewhere, we put economic issues on the ANZUS
agenda. These arguments were listened to politely but with absolutely no effect.
Whatever our strategic importance, in compartmentalised US administrations,
we were fair game for US economic interests — I do not think that has changed.
The 1980s was a difficult period for Australia’s trade not only because the United
States was targeting our agricultural export markets as, for a while, were the
Europeans. The US-EU subsidy war forced world agricultural prices down
generally. We also had problems in our resources trade with Japan. Japan was
playing ‘hard ball’ on our coal and iron ore prices: the global economic downturn
had led to an oversupplied market, to which Japan’s own activities had
contributed. Together with their unified negotiating tactics, this gave them a
strong bargaining position.
At this time, we had frequent joint ministerial meetings with Japan and those
meetings tended to revolve about resource trade issues. I had had a long
experience in dealings — not always successful — with Japan, a country and
people I like very much, and that experience was important in dealing with a
situation where we had evidence that a major Japanese company had breached
a firm Japanese prime ministerial commitment given to Australia. The choice
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was, as some suggested, confronting the Japanese authorities publicly with this
information or taking an approach that saved the face of the responsible minister.
After long discussion, under my urging and with Hayden’s support, we took
the latter course, resolving the issue but avoiding generating long-term
resentment.
These ministerial meetings had been essentially economic in substance but,
during this period, we started the first interchange with Japan on political issues,
although these subsequently seemed to fall by the wayside until more recently.
Not all ministers found the Japanese as easy to interact with as other countries
in Northeast Asia, such as the South Koreans and the Chinese, and I often found
it necessary to make the point that, difficult or not, Japan would long be the
major market for our exports.
Commonwealth meetings at the time were mostly quite interesting since South
Africa and apartheid was a central topic. Hawke was active in this environment,
since his opposition to racism was deeply held. South Africa was also targeting
Australia in trying to entice sports teams to visit South Africa to get around our
sporting boycott policy. I felt we were losing the argument within Australia and
first the minister and then I gave several public presentations that explained
why that was a problem.
Robert Mugabe at this time was still running what was then a more or less
showcase, tolerant country. One Commonwealth meeting, however, discussing
a report on Africa, revealed differences between the British Foreign Secretary,
Geoffrey Howe, and the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, that, for more
politically sensitive observers than I, were the kind of differences that ultimately
led to her losing Britain’s leadership. South Africa also brought Hawke and
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi close together and I will always remember
Gandhi’s extreme courtesy.
It was during the 1987 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in
Vancouver that, after consultation with Jim Wolfensohn, then a New York
banker, we fashioned an approach to financial sanctions on South Africa that,
elaborated in detail by a Treasury officer, was subsequently judged influential
in tightening substantially banking sanctions on South Africa’s apartheid regime
and contributed to its ultimate demise.
As I noted earlier, the Prime Minister’s reform program included reduced tariff
protection and this became an important part of the government’s international
agenda. The Uruguay Round was in its early stages and the promise by Hawke
to lower tariffs and bind them was significant in restoring our substantially
diminished credibility in the GATT negotiations. The full burden of the Uruguay




This came in 1987 and, although I was consulted and agreed with the move, it
was not my idea at this specific time. I could see its advantages, but I was worried
about the costs and about how balanced the outcome would be. Some of the
reasoning behind the change involved recollections of conflict, which although
once undoubted, were largely a matter of past history, while other bureaucratic
conflicts had emerged — such as those between the departments of Trade and
Primary Industry. The perception of the Department of Trade having served as
what was seen, not without justification, as a Country Party ‘secretariat’,
remained in some ministers’ minds and Trade had, as a consequence, been
considerably reduced in size and had lost much of its effectiveness and clout.
We had very little time to prepare for the change, but I thought it important to
make the change swiftly. By the formal date we had a new name on the building,
new stationery and a new organisational structure in place. The specifics had
been worked out cooperatively by working groups with equal representation
of the two old departments — a very constructive bonding exercise.
Together with an outstanding group of senior colleagues — Philip Flood, Peter
Field, Mike Costello and Mike Lightowler11  — I was concerned that, although
we acknowledged that two different departmental cultures existed, there was
to be no ‘we’ and ‘they’ in the amalgamated department, the importance of which
I had learned from the difficulties of the comparable Canadian amalgamation. I
think we substantially achieved that and, to a large extent, this ceased to be a
major issue.
There was a lot of stress, nevertheless. The Department of Finance had its own
agenda of cuts of staff and functions that had been in their sights for a long time,
such as the journalists of the Australian News and Information Bureau. We saved
some of them — but far from all — and concerns about career futures became
more widespread.
What the amalgamation did do was to enable us to perform much more effectively
in the Uruguay Round with great economic benefit to Australia. It became
possible to utilise the diplomatic network in particular — which responded
positively. The great strength of the Trade Department was its culture of
immensely thorough preparation for negotiations. It is almost certainly true that
the Australian delegation was better prepared than any other delegation: it had
detailed studies available to it from the BAE, which we fed into the negotiation
process and were then taken up by the OECD; we chaired the new service sector
negotiations; and Peter Field, the overall leader of the Australian delegation,
was probably more knowledgeable and experienced on the issues than the leaders
of other major delegations. With the backing that the Cairns Group and our
ministers gave him, he became an important player in the negotiations.
Unfortunately, Peter was taken seriously ill towards the end of the negotiations,
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in my view a consequence of the considerable stress associated with the
negotiations, and could not complete them.
The Cairns Group itself was an important initiative from the Trade department.
We were asked by the Minister for Trade, John Dawkins, to advise on its
feasibility. I favoured it, but suggested that Hayden test it out on the ASEAN
ministers that he would shortly be meeting — where the response was positive.
As a coalition of the willing, it eventually proved especially effective as a ‘third
force’ in the negotiations, despite problems with our Canadian colleagues that
I had foreshadowed to Dawkins.
These are just some of the issues of the day that affected my role as secretary.
Some of them, and others I have not dealt with, remain and many new issues
have arisen. I think that the department is now potentially much better equipped
through the amalgamation to deal with the range of current issues. I do wonder
whether the less open atmosphere of the current public service enables that
potential to be fully realised. And I do not see this ‘less open atmosphere’ as
necessarily associated with an appropriate increase in ministerial control
compared with earlier post-war decades. No-one would suggest that Hayden
had anything but full control.
I certainly found a strong internal debate to be critical to getting things as right
as one could. It was also what made the job so interesting. Without that interest,
I suspect the really high level of intellectual capacity needed to advise ministers
on how to pursue effectively Australia’s national interest internationally will
not stay in the department to rise to senior levels, but will be tempted to move
out after a few years of developing contacts and gaining saleable experience.
Fortunately that was not a problem for me when secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade.
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Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, 1988-92
Background
Richard Woolcott's tenure as secretary coincided with one of the most active
periods of Australian foreign policy under Gareth Evans, who began what would
become an eight-year term as Foreign Minister the day after Woolcott was
appointed.
Several Australian policy initiatives were active simultaneously. They included
Prime Minister Hawke's efforts to bring APEC into being, Evans’s determination
to contribute to the Cambodian peace process, the development of a security
dialogue in the Asia Pacific region (which was to become the ASEAN Regional
Forum), attempts to inject more substance into Australia’s relations with
Indonesia, and Trade Minister Michael Duffy’s push to bring to a successful
conclusion the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Australia
also pursued a more active role in the United Nations, the South Pacific and the
Indian Ocean.
Clearly, the most significant external event during the period was the end of
the Cold War. This required new policy approaches and enhanced cohesion
between defence and security policies generally. For Australia, it meant paying
attention to its alliance with the United States while enhancing self-reliance. The
other major event was the first Gulf War in 1991 (involving the Australian
Defence Force).
The department coped well with these demanding challenges during the period.
It was also managing technological change in its overseas network, which
underwent substantial upgrading during this period. Bedding down the
amalgamated department's new organisation and culture continued to be a high
priority. The absorption of the trade and information functions into the
department came to be regarded as one of the main successes of the 1987 moves
towards ‘mega-departments’. In time, and after some questioning, it was judged
a success by both major political parties and the National Party.
Woolcott's appointment as secretary came later in his career than may have been
expected (he had declined to be considered for the position in 1973). He had
already served in high profile Head of Mission positions, including a lengthy
period as Australia's Ambassador to the United Nations in New York (1982–88),
during which he represented Australia on the Security Council for two years.
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So Woolcott was already comparatively well known in Australia, the United
States and in the Asia Pacific region and was well placed to play a prominent
role in the initiatives launched by Hawke and Evans. His relaxed style of
leadership was suited to the demanding tasks facing the department and he was
a popular secretary.
Richard Woolcott has published The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from
Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings (Harper Collins 2003). He continues to be a
regular commentator on foreign policy.
Woolcott Presentation: June 8, 2006
While there is a value in talking about the past for the sake of the historical
record, I would have preferred to offer some views on present foreign policy
issues, especially those which relate to some of the problems with which I am
familiar such as relations with Indonesia, with the United States, Iraq and East
Timor. But that is not the purpose of this presentation.
I was the 16th secretary, counting from when it was called the Department of
External Affairs, which was established in 1901. I filled the office from 1988
until my retirement from the Australian Public Service in 1992. Unlike some of
my predecessors, like Peter Henderson, and some of my successors, I was
appointed after I had been serving in Indonesia, the Philippines and New York.
Except for occasional visits I had been away from Canberra for these 13 years
when I came back to take over the position of secretary. We used to have a
saying in the public service, especially about promotions, that if you are out of
sight, you are out of mind. I had expected to retire gracefully after my posting
in New York and was surprised when I was telephoned by the then Foreign
Minister, Bill Hayden, and asked to come back.
How did I obtain the job? I really do not know. Looking around I see friends
and colleagues who might well have been secretary of the department, in addition
to the two who were. Good fortune, or simply being in a particular place at a
particular time, together with the interaction of personal situations often entirely
outside one’s control and, indeed, the chemistry between senior personalities
involved in the decision-making process, can all play a major role in such
appointments.
I was fortunate to return to Canberra at a particularly active and challenging
time. Usually there is a broad continuity in the way that Australian foreign
policy is set, but 1988–89 was one of those defining periods; a watershed in
world events that caught many ministers and officials by surprise. At the outset
of my time the two great challenges of the previous four decades — that of
communism and Soviet imperialism — were being simultaneously overcome.
At the end of the Cold War there was a major shift in emphasis from global
political and strategic issues to economic considerations.
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In our own region, 1989 was the year that the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum (APEC), a major Australian initiative, was established. It was also the year
in which the Cambodian peace process and the regional security dialogue, which
lead to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in both of which Australia played a
leading role, were launched. So I found myself returning at an extremely
interesting but also very active and demanding time.
Shortly after my return to Canberra in August 1988, I had a long private meeting
with Prime Minister Bob Hawke. I am not sure that other prime ministers took
the same interest as Mr Hawke did in the management of departments, but I was
to assume duty on 1 September 1998, which was the day before Gareth Evans
became Foreign Minister. So, unlike my predecessor Peter Henderson, I had one
Foreign Minister right through my period and I am sure that is a much easier
situation to deal with than having a number.
Bob Hawke told me that my first priority would be to see that the amalgamation
of the two departments — Foreign Affairs and Trade — was made to work
effectively. He used the interesting phrase that it had been a ‘shotgun wedding’,
which would never have taken place if a bureaucratic committee had been
established to deal with the pros and cons of such a merger. But he argued that
it was logical and common sense for the foreign and trade policies of an essentially
trading nation situated in East Asia to be closely coordinated.
Secondly, he said that Australia had performed well on the United Nations
Security Council in 1985–86. We were now a middle-sized power that had a
good measure of international respect and we should be playing a more positive
role in regional diplomacy, once the administrative amalgamation was bedded
down.
Finally, I was somewhat taken aback when he said that my new Foreign Minister,
Gareth Evans, who would be starting the next day, would be on a sharp learning
curve and that I would need to ‘keep an eye on him’, an unusual role for the
secretary. He said that Gareth was a man of enormous drive and powerful
intellect, which I was to discover was absolutely right. But he also thought that
he was somewhat driven and there might be times when he would need steady
advice. That is really the role of any secretary. Even so, I thought this was a
rather interesting introduction to the job.
My first objective as secretary, apart from what Bob Hawke had spelt out, was
to bring together the cultures of the formerly quite distinct departments, which
had only recently been amalgamated. The Trade people felt they would be
swamped in the larger Foreign Affairs Department. The Foreign Affairs people
suspected that the Trade tail might wag the dog. My initial objective was to try
and bring those distinct cultures together. I was probably at an advantage having
been overseas for so many years, because I had not been part of the Canberra
bureaucratic infighting which may have preceded my appointment.
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My next task was to try to re-define the department’s priorities in pursuit of
Australia’s national interests in the rapidly changing world of the final decade
of the 20th century, particularly with a new Foreign Minister taking up duty
at this time. Thirdly, I wanted to develop a stronger sense of teamwork and
esprit de corps in the amalgamated department and, also, I particularly wanted
to improve communication within what was now a larger organisation than it
had been.
Then, of course, there was the issue to which Peter Henderson devoted quite a
bit of his lecture and that is the need to ensure effective management of a large
department in times of increasing financial stringency and accountability.
Also, I was not going to flinch from giving the two relevant ministers the best
professional advice available. All ministers say they want frank and fearless
advice, but my experience is that in reality few do, particularly if that advice
runs counter to what they themselves might want to do, or what they think
might be unpopular in a domestic political context.
As if those internal tasks were not enough, my period as secretary encompassed
a number of remarkable events which created great volatility in the international
situation — the Berlin Wall was demolished and Germany was reunited,
symbolising the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev had introduced perestroika
and glasnost, marking the retreat from Marxism and Leninism and inadvertently
precipitating the disintegration of the Soviet Union, thus playing a major part
in bringing the Cold War to an end. Then, of course, we had the first Gulf War
in 1991, which followed Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.
I found the secretaryship at this time hugely demanding, being responsible for
foreign policy advice not only to Gareth Evans, but also to the Minister for
Trade, Michael Duffy. On top of that, Bob Hawke as Prime Minister had a close
interest in foreign affairs and occasionally wanted direct advice.
In 1988–89 the Department had a budget of $1,304 million — a substantial
budget — and a total staff in 1988 of some 5,000, including locally engaged staff
overseas, as well as 90 overseas posts. There were times when I wondered
whether I, or for that matter anyone else, could handle the job effectively. I was
61 years old when I took up the post and I asked myself whether I had the
physical stamina and the intellectual energy for the work required, especially
with such an active Foreign Minister. I even wondered, privately, whether I
would fail the task and become an example of the ‘Peter Principle’ — someone
promoted to a level above his or her competence.
In 1989 the department faced what I considered to be an unusually demanding
situation, because in addition to the issues I have already mentioned, Gareth
Evans, whom I believe history will judge to be our most active Foreign Minister,
had launched four new initiatives. In addition, the Prime Minister had launched
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a major initiative — all of which proved to be very time consuming and a real
problem for the department in trying the handle them simultaneously.
The Prime Minister had launched the initiative to bring APEC into being. Gareth
Evans was determined to make a major contribution, both to the Cambodian
peace process and the development of a regional security dialogue. He also
wanted to put a lot of effort into what he called getting more ‘ballast’ or substance
into our very important relationship with Indonesia. Moreover, Michael Duffy,
the Minister for Trade, was determined to bring the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations to a successful conclusion, which would include
new benefits for Australian agriculture.
How were we to deal with such an extensive agenda? I decided the only way
to handle it properly was to delegate as much as possible. I remember I once
went into the office of one of my predecessors, Keith Waller1 , and noticed his
desk had no paper on it. I made the throwaway comment saying that I was
surprised to see his empty desk. His reply was: ‘My boy, I always regard an
officer’s intelligence as inversely proportional to the amount of paper on his
desk. The secret of this job is delegation.’ It is something which has stuck in my
mind.
What we decided to do was to give the deputy secretaries specific tasks. Besides
the amalgamation process, I focused on Mr Hawke’s request to bring APEC into
existence. Michael Costello, then a deputy secretary and later to be secretary,
worked tirelessly on Cambodia.2 The late Peter Field devoted himself almost
full time to trade facilitation and liberalisation through the Uruguay Round.
And Costello and I gave special attention to paving the way for a regional security
dialogue. The other deputy secretaries, Michael Lightowler, Dick Smith3  and
Paul Barrett, who later became secretary for Defence, dealt with the other general
duties.
I now want to touch on an issue that was raised in Peter Henderson’s
contribution, as an example of what can be the political aspects of the job. I was
concerned to hear rumours that the Opposition was sceptical about the
amalgamation of Foreign Affairs and Trade and was considering reverting to
two separate departments should it regain power at the 1990 election. So, with
the amalgamation under potential political threat, I decided it would be useful
to talk to the Leader of the Opposition, Andrew Peacock, and the then leader of
the National Party, Charles Blunt.4  It is not appropriate for a secretary to
undertake such activities with an opposition party without clearing it with his
minister and I did that.
It turned out to be very productive in that Peacock was persuaded that it would
be foolish to try to ‘de-amalgamate’ the departments. Blunt’s view was different
— he wanted to keep an open mind on it depending what portfolios his party
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might get if the Coalition won the election. Anyway it was all, in a sense, water
under the bridge, because the Government was returned and the situation of
confronting this question did not arise. I do feel, however, that had the
government changed, the department would have remained amalgamated and
I had taken the right course in dealing with this delicate political consultation.
As secretary, I decided to pay considerable attention to the appointment of
Australia’s representatives overseas — ambassadors, high commissioners and
consuls general. From the sidelines I had witnessed a number of poor
appointments which had contributed little to Australia’s international standing
and some which had even damaged our international reputation. Such
appointments were usually politically motivated, but some career officer
appointments were not as effective as they should have been.
It is quite clear that it is prerogative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make
such appointments and no secretary would question that. Gareth Evans normally
requested two or three names to be put forward by the secretary for each post,
even if he had a person in mind for it. It was then left for the minister to consult
the Prime Minister on the appointments to some of the major posts, usually
Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Jakarta, the United Nations and — for reasons
mainly related to prestige and to our history — London.
I understand that this situation has since changed. My understanding is that
the Prime Minister now [John Howard, at the time of Woolcott’s lecture] wants
to approve all appointments, even those to our smallest posts. This seems to me
to be a means of complicating the appointment process and reducing the authority
of the Foreign Minister.
I approached the issue of appointments with three main aims: Firstly, I wanted
to resist political appointments, many of which did not serve Australia’s
diplomatic interests and could undermine morale in the career service if there
were too many. There were six non-career heads of missions when I became
secretary, including those in London, The Hague, Dublin, Wellington and New
York. I derived some satisfaction from the fact that all of these had been replaced
by career officers when I retired and there was only one non-career appointment
overseas by March 1992. One of the reasons for this change was that Gareth
Evans took quite a strong stand against political appointees who he did not feel
would do the job effectively.
Some political appointments were successful and served Australia very well,
like Sir Robert Cotton5 , who was both an excellent Consul-General in New York
and an effective and popular Ambassador in Washington. On the other hand,
Senator Vincent Gair — the former Leader of the Democratic Labor Party —
was not a success.6  Gough Whitlam imagined that, by moving him out of the
Senate in 1974, he would get control of that chamber. I have to say I was really
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surprised when visiting Dublin in 1974 to hear some of the tales that were widely
circulating in the city at that time about Mr Gair.
My second aim was to ensure that recommendations for appointments, which I
put to the minister, were the best qualified and most suitable officers available
for the particular posts. My third intention was to recommend more female
officers on the basis of merit for Head of Mission appointments in what for years
had tended to be a male-dominated area. That is not necessarily the fault of my
predecessors or previous ministers, because for a long period of time a career
female diplomatic officer was obliged — quite wrongly in my view — to resign
if she got married. I was disappointed that, when I retired, we had only two
female Heads of Mission, but it would not be long before that number could be
substantially increased.
An initiative adopted during my period as secretary was to have a ministerial
directive prepared for each newly-appointed Head of Mission. These were
prepared at a senior level, vetted by me and signed by the minister. Their purpose
was to set out for the Heads of Mission at the beginning of their assignments,
the objectives to which they would be expected to work during their
appointment and the major issues with which they would be expected to deal.
There were, of course, unpredictable issues, but it was the extension of a process
aimed at ensuring our Heads of Mission overseas were properly informed about
policy thinking in Canberra and better equipped to make an input into the policy
formulation process. This went back to 1971 when the then secretary of the
Department, Keith Waller, and deputy secretary, Mick Shann, established the
Policy Research Branch, which I returned from Ghana to head at that time.7
We also introduced the Department’s first Corporate Plan to cover the period
1990 to 1993, which was launched jointly by Gareth Evans and Neal Blewett,
who was then the Minister for Trade Negotiations. It smacks a little of
managerialism, but it was a useful tool. It set out three-year programs for bilateral
relationships and trade relations and, while I was initially a little sceptical about
its value, it did turn out to be quite useful.
I was, as I have noted, secretary during the first Gulf War. It is instructive to
compare our involvement then with our participation in the American-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Of course, the war added significantly to the pressures
on the department. How does one handle this sort of situation? I established a
departmental task force in a special operations room that was open round the
clock and led by Ric Smith, a calm and able officer who later became secretary
of the Department of Defence.
I think Mr Hawke’s handling of the Iraq situation was considered and
constructive. He invited me as secretary to attend some of the meetings he had
with the cabinet sub-committee he had established to deal with the war. This
committee included Paul Keating, Gareth Evans, Senator Robert Ray and Senator
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John Button.8 With the decision to make a contribution to Operation Desert
Storm virtually made, I saw my role as one of bringing possible foreign policy
ramifications to the notice of Senator Evans and the Prime Minister. I said that
we had a clear case of aggression by one member of the United Nations against
another and it would be useful nevertheless — because the situation involved
the Middle East — to explain our policy, preferably in advance, to those countries
in South East Asia which had Islamic majorities including Indonesia, Brunei and
Malaysia, as well as those with important minorities — the Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand — and suggested to Bob Hawke that he stress the Australian
Government had no hostility towards Islam; that the military campaign was
purely an exercise to repel aggression.
In retrospect, I believe Bob Hawke’s and Gareth Evans’s approach was eminently
sound, especially as it was the first time that Australian forces would be
committed overseas since Vietnam. The Prime Minister himself briefed all the
Middle Eastern Ambassadors and the announcement was delayed for about 12
hours while our Heads of Mission in South East Asia informed the foreign
ministers of those countries. I believe this was a sound approach. It was an
approach which, unfortunately, was not followed, as far as I know, when
Australian forces were committed to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
I think in fairness to officials who were involved during this period, there was
a substantial difference between the situations of 1991 and 2002–03. Senior
officials and the heads of intelligence organisations were dealing with a decision
already taken at the highest level between the Prime Minister and the President
of the United States in 2003. The role of the bureaucracy and the intelligence
organisations was therefore reduced to one of implementation.
I am going to say something about the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development, really as an example of how the secretary needs to be a ‘jack of
all trades’. The secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was
the alternate Governor to the Treasurer on the Bank’s board.
The Treasurer, then Paul Keating, telephoned me and said he was going to go
to the inaugural meeting of the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development, but he could now not attend. As I was the Deputy Governor I
would need to go in his place. So I got on a plane, flew to London, made a speech
and flew back. I worked out when I got back to Canberra that I had been in the
air for much longer than I had been at the conference. So even with the
advantages of modern air travel, situations are not always as attractive as they
might seem to be.
I decided shortly after I became secretary that we should have a Management
Information Report (MIR). We already had a highly classified Policy Information
Report (PIR), which I had launched in 1971 in order to keep Heads of Missions
in the field involved in the policy process in Canberra. So the Management
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Information Report (MIR) was introduced. Senator Hill was participating in a
Senate Estimates Committee hearing and he asked me what the MIR was about.
I said that I had always believed — and my predecessors and successors would
probably accept this — that an effective Department, or for that matter an
effective Australian Mission abroad, must rest on a sound and competent
administrative footing. I believed that good management is critical to the
effectiveness of the department. That was the theme we used in the Management
Information Report to keep our people updated on managerial changes and
issues.
The conduct of Australian foreign policy is a continuing process and the
secretary, together with his senior support staff, has a major role in advising
ministers on a wide range of political and administrative issues. Officials do not
make policy, although the myth is sometimes perpetrated in the media that they
do. Ministers are responsible for policy decisions.
I found that one of the satisfactions during my time was observing younger
officers grow into the task of understanding our external interests and our role
in the wider world. I was enormously impressed by the qualifications, intelligence
and dedication on the part of many of the younger officers and I could not escape
the feeling that they were probably better qualified than my generation for the
jobs they were going to do.
It is really for others, not for me, to judge how the department worked during
my period in charge. People tend to gloss over the shortcomings and accentuate
the merits of the about-to-retire and the newly dead. When you embark on a
job like the secretaryship, you start off wanting to build some sort of highway
to the future, but I am afraid that we all end up mending a few potholes and
hoping that one day successors, other officers, will complete the highway.
In conclusion, all I can say is that it was an exacting, demanding and
extraordinarily interesting position and, despite the strains, the long hours and
the pressures it imposes on families, I felt honoured to have been given the
opportunity to do something for this country and its people. I did my best to
achieve the tasks the Government had set for the department, together with
those I had set for myself. I do not think one can do more than that.
One final point I want to make in closing is that the officers of the department,
despite the enormously increased pressures on them, responded very creditably
to those pressures at all levels during my period in charge between 1988 and
1992.
Question: Were cables sent back by Missions overseas
given sufficient weight?
This is always an issue. In any particular post you have a better grip on what is
happening in that country. In Canberra, the minister, his officers and the
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department are looking at the whole picture, not just one aspect of it. So I think
it is an important part of the Head of Mission’s role to keep pushing the issues
of concern to his own area particularly when they are going to impinge on
Australian foreign policy.
I am not in a position to comment on the ‘culture of compliance’, which many
say has grown up in the public service. It certainly was not the case during the
period I am talking about. The best thing people in the field can do is to continue
to put their cases. I do not know whether that is done so much now because of
modern technology. E-mails have tended to replace cables; the telephone can
be used if you want to say something you may not want recorded.
I have done that myself. I remember that in Indonesia when Malcolm Fraser
became the caretaker Prime Minister after Gough Whitlam’s dismissal, he sent
a message to President Suharto which he wanted me to give to him without any
publicity. I arranged to do this at his house, but there was a phrase in the message
that I had doubts about. This was to tell the president that Fraser wanted to
have the same sort of close relationship that Gough Whitlam had developed and
Australia would like to see a solution to the East Timor problem in terms of
Indonesia’s interests.
I sent a telegram back saying that President Suharto would probably ask what
this meant. I said the Government’s policy had always been that the use of force
could not be condoned and I presumed that in a caretaker situation that would
remain, but it was not in the message. There was silence from Canberra, so I
telephoned John Menadue, who was the secretary of the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet. After 24 hours he rang back and said the Prime
Minister had said the words stand on their own merit and they were not to be
interpreted by the Ambassador.
I saw Suharto and he asked what the phrase meant. I said, under our constitution,
existing policy is not changed by a caretaker government and our policy is that
the use of force cannot be condoned. I realised that I had exceeded my
instructions and I did not have the guts to put it in a cable. E-mails did not exist
then, so I telephoned the late Graham Feakes, who was then Head of the South
East Asian Division, and told him what I had said and suggested he might endorse
the file to this effect for the record.
Question: Do you consider that three years is an optimum
period to be secretary? It would be considered an incredibly
short period for the chief executive of a large bank.
The period depends on the individual. Health and age can be factors. You have
someone like Sir Arthur Tange, who was secretary first of External Affairs and
then of Defence for a total of about 21 years, with an interval of five years as
High Commissioner in New Delhi.9  On the one hand, you have the value of
48
Steady Hands Needed
accumulated experience but, on the other, depending on the pressures, a danger
of burnout. When Sir Keith Waller retired, I asked why he was going and he
said, ‘If I stay in this job another year it will kill me.’ When I was secretary I
became more aware of what he had meant.
Three years is too short. Perhaps four is right, although I would suggest not
more than five. Things were different in the past. Senior public servants had
somewhat more influence, the pace was slower and the problems less complex.
You also need to think of opportunities for the younger up-and-coming officers.
Question: There is a general impression that in the last 10
years the Australian Public Service has become not a
service of the public, but a ministerial service. Do you think
there has been this change in Foreign Affairs?
The people here today who are in Foreign Affairs are probably able to give you
a better answer. What happens, when a Government has been in office for a
long time and with senior officers now on contract, is that there is a general
reluctance to be the harbinger of bad news.
You have seen that in the ‘Children Overboard affair’. You have seen it more
recently with the Australian Wheat Board. In the case of the Wheat Board there
are only two possible explanations for what happened. The idea of amalgamating
Foreign Affairs and Trade was that the differences between trade policy and
foreign policy would be solved under the one roof. Yet here you have a situation
where the interests of a former government agency, recently privatised, is to
protect the wheat market in Iraq. At the same time the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Minister were preparing to invade Iraq.
It seems extraordinary that the Prime Minister, the Minister for Trade and the
Foreign Minister never saw any of the warning messages. One explanation is
that they may not be telling the whole truth; the other is that there has been a
measure of reluctance to ensure ministers saw the messages they should have
seen. I would have thought the ministers’ staffs would have taken the cables
and said, ‘you need to look at this’. When ministers say they get thousands of
cables a day and they can’t look at them all, that is true, but the role of ministerial
staff is to make sure they see those they need to see.
You hear about the culture of compliance, that staff do not want to pass on bad
news. It also enables plausible deniability by ministers. I do not know if this is
true but, if it is true, it is unhealthy.
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Question: There has always been tension between the
departments because of the different focus and interests.
Could you tell us what was the issue that caused you most
trouble in that regard and did you think the inter-ministerial
mechanisms that were in place in your day were sufficient
to cope with this.
This sparks a thought on which I should have focused. During my period there
really were no great tensions. We had a mechanism — I do not know whether
it still exists — that we called the policy coordination meeting. That consisted
of the secretary and the deputy secretaries meeting with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the Minister for Trade and their respective chiefs of staff. We would
go through current issues. Normally someone from the Prime Minister’s Office
would sit in on that too. The whole purpose of it was to see that responses to
issues were coordinated. Whilst there were some fairly robust arguments from
time to time, it seemed to be a very effective mechanism in preventing the
problems you are talking about.
Question: What were the highlights of your career, both
as secretary and before you were secretary?
There are always highs and lows in any job. I suppose the highlights were the
successful establishment of APEC in 1989 and, before that, representing Australia
on the UN Security Council in 1985–86. On APEC, I was in Canberra at the time.
I tended to accompany the Prime Minister on overseas visits, but when Mr
Hawke went to Korea, I did not accompany him because Gareth Evans was away
in Washington. That was when Mr Hawke launched the idea of an Asia Pacific
Economic Consultative forum on the good grounds that the world was in danger
of breaking up into three financial blocs — the Deutschmark bloc, a Dollar bloc
and a Yen bloc — and Australia would be marginalised.
Canberra diplomatic missions were ringing me up and all the journalists were
ringing me up and asking what this was all about: a huge new initiative out of
the blue over lunch in Korea. Gareth Evans was also quite angry because he was
in Washington and, because of the time difference, Jim Baker10  who was the
US Secretary of State, knew about it while Evans did not.
Baker was angry, asking how could Australia take this major initiative without
even consulting America, even excluding the United States from the list of
participants? So I prepared a note, outlining what needed to be done to convince
the ASEAN countries they were not going to be marginalised. We needed to
consider the status of America, also that of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. There
were a number of difficult issues to be resolved.
Mr Hawke made the announcement in January 1989 and the first APEC
Ministerial meeting took place in Canberra in November of that year, so we took
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only 11 months to get a really major and, initially, somewhat criticised, initiative
up and running, which I think has been very valuable to Australia. Every so
often people say that it is moribund, but it is not. APEC has achieved much and
it is still doing a lot of practical, useful things for the business community, such
as harmonising customs regulations. So I suppose, if I were to identify a high
point, it would APEC.
Another highlight of my career was helping to secure Australia’s election in
1984 to the UN Security Council with a then record majority. I then had the
honour to represent Australia on the Council for two very active and stimulating
years. That was a demanding but essentially successful exercise. I feel we
advanced Australia’s standing at the United Nations.
It is strange but I feel I am becoming like a British colonial governor — an extinct
species — because I was our last representative on the Security Council. We
have not been on it since 1986 and it does not seem we can get elected in a secret
ballot at present, unless we can secure an uncontested spot. This is not good for
our standing in the United Nations and I hope this situation will change in the
future.
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Secretary, Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993–96
Background
Michael Costello was secretary in the last years of the Keating Labor Government,
years characterised, above all, by an intensification of Australia’s engagement
with Asia. This ambition for more comprehensive relationships with Asia was
occasioned partly by the end of the Cold War but was also generated by the
need felt by Australia — along with most other countries — to define its role
in the new global order. The debate about civilisation and values sparked by
Samuel Huntington’s 1993 ‘Clash of Civilizations’ article was a foretaste of the
challenges of terrorism and the ‘rise’ of Islam.1
Internationally, this period marked some high points and low points for
multilateralism. It not only featured the completion of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, but also the emergence of unprecedented
regionalism around the world: in Europe (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty); in North
America (the 1993 NAFTA Agreement); and in the Asia Pacific (APEC’s first
summit was in 1993). Tragically, it was also the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia
and the aftermath, including the United Nations mixed record in humanitarian
intervention and nation-building.
Costello was secretary of the Department of Industrial Relations at the time of
his appointment to head DFAT. He had previously been, for several years, deputy
secretary of the department and had also served as Australian Ambassador to
the United Nations in New York. He had played a prominent role in negotiating
the Cambodia Peace Agreement on behalf of Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans,
personally undertaking what was perhaps Australia’s first example of ‘shuttle
diplomacy’.
During this period, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Costello
himself, were directly involved in Australia’s pro-active approach to Asia. Yet
departmental management continued to be strained by expectations that ‘DFAT
would do more with less’.2  Costello was comfortable with both his policy and
managerial responsibilities. The Howard Government’s summary dismissal of
Costello, along with five other departmental secretaries, when it took office in
March 1996 was much later described by journalist Paul Kelly as ‘the greatest
blood-letting upon any change of government since Federation’.3
Since leaving DFAT, Michael Costello has, amongst other things, been active as
a commentator on national and international affairs for The Australian newspaper,
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while also working as CEO of ACTEW, the Australian Capital Territory’s
electricity and water authority.
Costello Presentation: 8 November 2006
I last spoke to the Institute of International Affairs on the 23 February 1995. I
have nothing but fond memories of this Institute. Even so, I was reluctant to
speak here today. First of all, I am quite concerned about these occasions. The
trouble with former heads of this and bosses of that is we feel deep down that
we were giants in our time and everything has ‘gone to the dogs’ since we left.
We tell old ‘war stories’ and we regale ourselves about how the young chaps of
the day cannot measure up and, of course, none of that is true. So I hope I avoid
that in this presentation.
Another reason, which is a very practical one, is that I did not leave the
department in the familiar way of most secretaries. That is, I did not retire with
accolades all round. Along with five of my secretary colleagues at the time, I
was sacked in 1996 by the incoming Government.
Fortunately, I did not have an individual contract, so that I could leave in some
sort of order. Some of my colleagues were told on Thursday evening or Friday
morning that their time was up and they had to hand in their car keys and leave
by lunchtime. It was one of the truly ugly occasions of my working life. This
did not happen to me only because I had not signed an individual contract. I
had stayed with the more traditional way of doing things. This is a long lead-up
to what is basically an excuse. I have a full-time job. After I left DFAT, I went
to work as deputy managing director of the Australian Stock Exchange until
1999 when I joined Kim Beazley (then Leader of the Opposition) as his chief of
staff.
After the election of 2001, I was — in those beautiful words — ‘between
engagements’, ‘resting’ for about 18 months. Then I became managing director
of ACTEW Corporation. Most of you will be familiar with seeing my ugly face
on television at various times asking you to use less water. That has been a
surprisingly stimulating and interesting job and certainly a full-time one when
I add it to my other directorships and writing a weekly column for The
Australian.
Again, this is a long way of saying that I have not had time to write a carefully
worded speech, the kind of excellent and thoughtful review of my time as
secretary that you have heard from Peter Henderson and Dick Woolcott, and I
have not had the time to access the records. So today I am doing this from notes.
I cannot claim to be like Sir Arthur Tange, who used to speak from four dot
points and produce perfectly parsed sentences. And certainly not as well as
Gareth Evans who could deliver not just perfect sentences off the cuff, but
perfect paragraphs. But I will do my best.
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I will talk about a few of the big Departmental issues from my time as secretary
— issues, which I feel are still important and major today — to see where they
have gone. I will also touch on a few of the big policy issues which were around
at that time and reflect on where they stand today: to see what is different and
to see if there are any general conclusions to be drawn.
What are the Departmental issues? Dick Woolcott was the secretary who had to
implement the integration of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He
took that very hot potato and lobbed it in my direction, along with Michael
Lightowler and Peter Field as my deputy secretaries.4 We embarked on a very
intensive period when we put the two departments together.
The reason I raise this is because the newspaper I write for recently ran a vigorous
campaign asking whether this had been such a good idea after all. It did so in
the context of the Australian Wheat Board scandal. Their argument was that if
you had kept the two departments separate, the old Department of Foreign
Affairs, with its focus on concerns about rigorous enforcement of United Nations
Security Council resolutions, would have made certain that this would not have
happened. Because it was an amalgamated organisation, so went the argument,
it gave priority to trade issues, or at least the same people who were responsible
for the foreign policy issues also had to weigh the balance of our trade interests.
So rather than having a tremendous contest that would have to be resolved in
cabinet, it was resolved at a lower level, even perhaps subconsciously.
I profoundly disagree with that point of view. I always thought that the marriage
between Foreign Affairs and Trade was one of the best things that has happened
in the public service. It did, at the time, lead to greater application of resources
and focus on what were and remain priorities for us — economic and trade
issues. But it is a simple fact that, as the counsel assisting the Cole Inquiry into
the Australian Wheat Board remarked at the time, in the period up to the middle
of 1996 the department had vigorously implemented, overseen and insisted on
the letter of the Iraq sanctions. Something changed after that and the investigation
was, in part, into what happened.5
I think it is fair to say that in my day I never found the government saying to
me that I should pull my punches on foreign policy because Australia had an
important trade concern at stake. It may have been because of the particular
personality of Gareth Evans, the minister at the time, who was such a dominant
figure. But I do not think it is a systemic issue and that is the point that I really
want to lead into now.
There is a great deal of talk in the press about the independence of the public
service — has it been compromised? It was a big issue in my day and indeed
there are some people who would say that my very appointment raised this
issue. After all, it was no secret that I was a member and a strong supporter of
the Labor Party. One is allowed to be such and I think that is still the case. But
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there could have been a view that I got the job because of my involvement with
the ALP.
All I know is that my first job as departmental secretary was as head of the
Department of Industrial Relations. We brought in the first enterprise bargaining
system in the Australian Public Service, negotiating the first ever federal
enterprise bargaining agreement. It was an interesting situation — me and a
note-taker on our side of the table and 34 trade unionists on the other.
Leaving aside my appointment, I am worried that somehow there is a view that
there is a Platonic ideal of the national interest, which exists somewhere in the
ether, that is really only understood by the public service, or indeed in some
cases, by the military as, potentially, in Fiji. People who hold this view are saying
that we, the public servant and the military, are the final repositories of what
is the public interest. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand may have
been democratically elected and was almost certain to be re-elected
overwhelmingly in the next election, but he was seen by the military to be
‘acting against the public interest’, so he was replaced. You hear the same
argument from the commander of the armed forces in Fiji. There seems to be a
residual idea that there is a higher loyalty among public servants or the military
than to the government of the day. In my view, this is absolutely and completely
wrong.
We all have our views of what constitutes the national interest. We can all go
to an election and contest it, by standing ourselves, or supporting particular
political parties or simply by voting. In the end, the people who are elected in
an election are the people who decide, for the period of their time in government,
what is going to be the national interest. So, it is the duty of public servants to
give the best, firmest and clearest, most uncompromising policy advice they
possibly can and, indeed, to press it hard if they believe it. But, it is also their
job to accept the answer or, if they cannot tolerate it, to ask to be shifted
somewhere else or to leave. I say this because many people to whom I feel close
and with whom I identify on policy issues, seem to me to have a view that
somehow in accepting a minister’s decision a public servant is compromising
their independence. In my view, they are not; they are simply doing their job.
This is one of the things that makes me uncomfortable about ‘freedom of
information’. There has been a lot of argument about this, but it can make you
uncomfortable about committing some things to paper as a public servant
because, when you say things in very direct terms in writing to a minister, you
worry that someone might get access to it and the minister might be politically
damaged by quotes from contrary advice from the public service. If for some
reason or other the minister gets advice and does not act on it, it is seen as an
outrage and a disgrace, yet it is their job as minister to make the decision.
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In a legitimate debate about what should be open and what should not, this is
a problem which is not given enough credence, yet I do feel it is having a real
impact on what public servants are prepared to put on record in notes and advice.
The absolute key, in my view, was the independence of the secretary and the
senior officers. That is why I opposed the legislation of 1984, brought in by
Labor, removing the permanency of secretaries. It is why I opposed the
introduction of contracts in 1994 and refused to accept one. Secretaries and
senior officers of the department are the bulwark, knowing that, while they
may be removed from a particular job by a minister, they are not going to be
thrown on the scrap heap of unemployment at the age of 45. It was suggested
to me that a secretary was cowardly to put their livelihood ahead of the national
interest and this may be true. But if you have kids at school and things like that
to worry about, you might be tempted.
In the end, whether it is ministerial staff or ministers or whatever, what matters
is the culture established by the government of the day. You can have all the
systems, checks and balances that you like, but it is the culture established by
the minister of that department and, indeed, by the cabinet of the day, that
matters. I think the problems you see in the Immigration Department are not
systemic, but are undoubtedly the result of the culture established there. I am
not saying it is an illegitimate culture — I am not arguing that here, although I
have my personal views — but it is a culture established by the government
and it bears the responsibility for this.
I will now turn to some big policy issues of the day and focus on one of the
issues that distresses me even today and this is trade. During my time as secretary,
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations came to fruition. It was a tremendous
time for trade policy: huge advances were made in that round. One of the reasons
was because Australia resisted the drive by the United States Secretary of State,
James Baker, for what the Americans described as a ‘hubs and spokes’ policy.
That is, the United States would be the hub and they would send out spokes
and we would all be little points revolving around the United States. So the
United States wanted preferential trade agreements. We resisted this as strongly
as we could because we knew it would undermine the Uruguay Round
negotiations and we were able to stop it.
One of the tragedies of trade policy today is that we have fallen for these so-called
bilateral free trade agreements that are properly called Preferential Trade
Agreements. Despite all the arguments to the contrary, I do not think there is
any doubt that it has undermined dramatically and drastically the drive for a
new round of multilateral trade liberalisation. I think it has substantially
undermined support for free trade in the United States in particular, yet US
support for a multilateral round is really the sine qua non. You will see after the
November 2006 mid-term election in the United States a substantial period ahead
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when the Congress will not support new multilateral free trade arrangements:
you might as well put them on the back burner. I put this down primarily to
this drive for preferential trade agreements.
I will now turn to Asia. This is a big subject. Many people associate Paul Keating
with Australia’s push into Asia, but in fact it goes back to the 1950s. It goes
back to Dick Woolcott who invented APEC. But it is true to say that both Bob
Hawke and especially Keating gave greater emphasis to our involvement in Asia.
One of the things that is very unfortunate about the debate in this country is
that it was portrayed as a policy of ‘we are Asians’. The then Leader of the
Opposition, John Howard, claimed that the policy of the Labor Party was to
make us Asians and that it was a policy of downgrading the relationship with
the United States, which was quite untrue.
Keating’s drive at the time was, in significant part, due to his concern about a
disengagement of the United States from the region. He believed it would be
bad for our national interest if the United States was to lose interest in Asia and
to focus only on narrow aspects of its relationship with the Eastern Rim of the
Pacific. That was why he worked so hard to take what was originally a Hawke
proposal, that is APEC, and to turn it into something much bigger. Dick Woolcott
led the effort as the Government’s Special Envoy and, later, I had a modest role
as secretary.
The aim of APEC was to create an overarching structure that would commit the
United States at presidential level to the region, along with China. It worked for
a while but, unfortunately, there was a strong drive by Prime Minister Mahathir
of Malaysia, strongly but privately supported by China, to enlarge APEC so
much that it would lose a lot of its salience. They succeeded substantially in
doing this.
The ASEAN Regional Forum, an Evans initiative, was also established at this
time. I simply do not know enough to comment on how well it is working now.
What we have really seen in the last 10 years is a Chinese effort to create
structures that will exclude the United States, which is working pretty well.
The East Asian Summit will, over time, challenge the APEC Summit — you will
not get heads of countries coming to two leadership meetings on a regular basis
— and of course the key thing about the East Asian Summit is that it does not
include the United States. This is not just the fault of the Chinese and those who
planned it this way. It is also the fault of the United States which in this
presidential period has had far less interest in the structures of South East Asia,
focusing instead on North Asia as it traditionally did: first, the threat from China
and, now, from North Korea plus the relationship with Japan. It is much less




On the subject of Australia’s relations with Indonesia, we live with deep distrust
between the two countries, not just from our side, but from their side towards
us. Probably, in Australia it is a sentiment that is found in our population. In
Indonesia, it is partly population, but their elites are more hostile and dislike us
far more than our elites dislike and distrust Indonesia. This results from
Australian governments doing things that were unavoidable, such as in East
Timor and taking refugees from West Irian (West Papua, as it is called now). It
is very hard to convince Indonesia, despite the new Australian security agreement
with them, that Australians do not secretly support the separation of West Papua.
Why is that? Because we once had an absolutely adamant, uncompromising
commitment to Indonesia’s sovereignty in East Timor. Indeed, Prime Minister
Howard’s famous letter to then President B.J. Habibie proposing the great
referendum said the whole purpose of this was to support the Government’s
absolute commitment to the continued incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia.
Unfortunately, Habibie was one of the more erratic human beings and went
down a path that was entirely unexpected.
But imagine your feelings about this if you were an Indonesian. You had seen
Australian political parties on both sides (and Prime Minister Howard more
vigorously than perhaps any other figure, if you go back and read his statements
over 20 years) saying that East Timor is part of Indonesia and we will continue
to support that when, in the end, we did not. What would you, as an Indonesian,
think when we make similar protestations about Irian Jaya? So we have a really
difficult time ahead of us that is not going to be solved by one prime minister
or a particular government. It will take perhaps 50 years of sustained effort and
I do not think we are putting the sustained effort into the human and cultural
language links that we need.
As for ‘the Great Powers’, I remember it being said in the 1980s that Japan was
going to take over the world and be the world’s number one economy. Some
said this meant the end of the American empire. Whoops! In the 1990s there was
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West conflict — at least
it seemed that way. The United States was the sole superpower: described by
Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State as the ‘indispensable superpower’, described
today as the ‘unavoidable superpower’. Now, of course, we are seeing the limits
of that power.
We are seeing the rise of China and India, particularly economically. This is
hardly surprising, even looking back to the evidence available then. If you pour
in enough labour and enough capital then, as the Soviet Union found right up
to the mid-1960s, your economy can grow faster than anyone else’s. But there
is a certain point where you hit technology barriers where you cannot pour in
any more labour and capital: you need much higher levels of technology and
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skills and training. China and India are nowhere near that point yet, but China
is probably nearer to it than India.
In my view the Western Alliance — and this is a big statement — is fairly much
dead. On Islam: we missed its rise; we missed the implications of the return of
Khomeini and the hostage crisis in Iran; we missed the implications of Hezbollah;
we missed the implications of what was happening with the various terrorist
attacks of the time. We simply did not grasp its fundamental importance to the
next 20 or 30 years. I think we still underestimate how important and how
fundamental this is going to be for us.
The main problem for Australia remains much the same. We do not have the
military power to impose our will on others. The Solomon Islands and Papua
New Guinea — even East Timor — have shown us that. We do not have the
economic power to bribe others to get our way. We need to persuade people. It
is a very old fashioned idea and it is called diplomacy. We need to invest a huge
amount of time, effort and resources into it.
One of the things I did when I was secretary was have a global plan approved
by the cabinet for a substantial increase in the resources we devoted to the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on the political side, rather than just
trade. I felt we really needed to up upgrade our political reporting on Indonesia,
the region and the world. It was great plan, but there was a change of government
and the department was cut by 25 per cent for budgetary reasons and it was not
possible. I think this argument remains valid and I think it is particularly true
in the case of Indonesia. Dick Woolcott coined a phrase: Australia is ‘the odd
man in of Asia’. That means ‘yes’, we are part of it; ‘yes’, we do our best; but
always as the slightly odd figure at the table. We have got to learn to be
comfortable with that and operate that way, rather than insisting we can be just
like the other Asians. We are not like them and they do not think we are and,
indeed, our own people do not think we are.
What about the ‘realism’ versus ‘idealism’ debate? What it comes down to is
this: I always like to have in my mind the three ‘Ps’ — principle, pragmatism
and patience. I believe if you do not have, at the forefront of your foreign policy
and the way you conduct it, the right principles — that is ideals — you will fail
in the medium to long term. I do not believe the idea that stability, above all, is
the key idea. I think that has been disproved. But you need absolute pragmatism
in pursuit of those principles and ideals and that is exactly what we have not
seen in the case of the current war in Iraq. No pragmatism, no quality in
execution, no ability to undertake this properly and think it through carefully
and to accept that it might take 15 to 25 years to achieve your goals there and
that you will then have to take steps sideways and backwards. You cannot




This brings me to the third point — patience. When I look back at our success
with Cambodia, we did something that was well worthwhile.3 But you would
not look at Cambodia now and say how wonderful it is, because it isn’t and it
won’t be for maybe another 30 years. The Western world’s own attainment of
democracy, liberalism and economic success took us centuries and we should
not expect that we can achieve these ideals quickly there. But what we must
not do is take those issues off the agenda.
The task remains the same and the principles remain the same. The quality of
the people working in the department is as high, if not higher than it ever was.
They are outstanding individuals. I do not know the current secretary but, by
all accounts, he is a fine person. You look at people like Nick Warner in Defence,
which is a fine appointment. Ric Smith was a great leader, Dennis Richardson,
Paul O’Sullivan, all first rate people.6
So in the end we can fall into the danger of focusing too much on ‘it is not the
way it was in our day’. No, it is not; it is a different game. But in the end, the
whole culture, the whole approach, is set by the government of the day. That
is, what we as public servants and diplomats have to accept. That is the key
conclusion I have come to looking back on that time. The quality of the politicians
and their ideology is what dictates how you proceed.
Question: The rise of China is a major challenge. How do
we go about adjusting to it?
The reality of Chinese power is that it is not as great as many think it is. The
Chinese economy is still quite a bit smaller than that of California and its military
capability — its strategic reach — is extremely limited. However, in military
and security terms, where it matters is dragging in our allies into a conflict over
Taiwan. This is the only circumstance where I could see China using military
power outside its borders, unless something truly unexpected happens in Korea.
My view of China is that they regard the last 400 to 500 years as an aberration.
They see, along with parts of the Islamic world, that the time of the West is over
and they will return to their rightful position as the leading power in the world
sometime in the next 40 or 50 years. I think they are also very patient about it.
They have that pragmatism and patience I was talking about and they are going
to risk little in achieving their goals. They are certainly going to risk very little
within their country. There is no particular sign of any liberalisation. Our
problem is that we are dealing with a country that is a dictatorship and, quite
often a particularly unpleasant one. Yet we have important economic and trade
interests with it.
We have managed this before and I do not see that we should not continue to
be able to do so. But what worries me is if we pursue fundamental human rights
issues with China only in a purely pro forma way. I think you can do both
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because, in the end, China is pragmatic. If it needs what we have to sell, it will
buy it at the right price. So you can pursue human rights in a real way. But
China is obsessed — and I can see why — with easing the United States out of
this part of the world. I think the Americans have relatively little interest in
South-east Asia and that is a factor in the present US government’s total
preoccupation with the Middle East and North Asia. We are going to be more
on our own and whether or not Australia can be in lock-step with the United
States in this part of the world is a big question.
I do not think that simply saying ‘have whatever you want’ is a basis for policy
towards China any more than it should be a policy in relation to any other
country. But I fear there is a strong lobby in Australia, particularly in the
business community, which feels this should be the case.
Question: There seems to be a push to put some substance
into our relations with India. This has happened at least
four times. Have we left it too late?
I think we have tried. You can only court someone if they want to be courted.
They simply were not interested in us, in part for a good long while because
they saw us as simply lackeys of the Americans and their tilt was towards the
Soviet Union. I remember trying to engage the Indians myself as part of one of
those efforts you have recalled. It was one of my many failures — they just were
not interested. They visited Australia; we had what we thought were some
terrific days; we thought we had broken through the barriers. Then the word
came back later to the effect that they had looked at all the ideas we discussed
and on reflection decided ‘perhaps not’.
I do not think we have missed the boat in economic or trade terms. Who knows?
You have in China a disciplined government of a traditional authoritarian kind
and it has the curious combination of authoritarian goal-setting but also
semi-market forces, at least in the international exposure of its economy. But if
you look carefully at what they are doing, you see that they have massive
amounts of surplus labour available and they are able to get access to large
amounts of capital through their own domestic savings and through foreign
investment. If you put the two together and just keep pouring it in, your
economy is going to grow and grow strongly.
It happened to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and early 1960s when they were
growing more strongly than the United States. When Nikita Khrushchev banged
his shoe on the table and said ‘we will bury you’, he was actually talking about
burying the United States economically. And at the time it seemed as though
they would. Then they ran out of surplus labour and ran out of capital and they
had a technology issue with lack of access to the latest in thinking and ideas.
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I do not think India will face that problem. They are hugely well educated and
are involved with some of the world’s great institutions. However, I think the
Chinese have learnt that lesson too and they are investing hugely in education,
which is a challenge to us. One of our most important industries in this country
is our education industry. But if we do not invest more in it, through either the
public or private sector, much more than we do at the moment, we are not going
to be able to attract them and they are going to turn more and more to their own
capabilities.
To sum up, we are far from too late with India. If the Indians see there is a dollar
to be made from us, they will be in it. If we are not worth trading with, they
won’t. We just have to be competitive.
Question: Cambodia was a success, can you comment on
the drivers that made it a success and their application to
the problems of today?
The negotiations were a success. But everyone focuses on that extremely brief
period from late 1989 to the middle of 1990. The deal was actually done in
September 1990. But the process began in 1983. Bill Hayden worked very hard
at it for three or four years, but it did not work then, the reason being the
geo-strategic situation did not allow it. At the time the Soviet Union was still a
dominant power, second only to the United States: China saw itself as being
threatened by the Russians on its northern border and on its southern border
it saw itself as being threatened by Vietnam, a Soviet ally as it was then. It saw
Cambodia as a field for playing out that conflict, so it gave its support to the
Khmer Rouge.
When that changed and the Soviet Union collapsed, Moscow could no longer
afford to have Vietnam as a client and Vietnam said, ‘we are sorry, we cannot
be in Cambodia any more’. The Chinese saw that they did not have to worry
about Vietnam being a threat. It also meant that the Thais no longer had the
threat of the Vietnamese against their border. So the whole geo-strategic situation
opened up and the reason Australia had credibility to pull this off was because
of Hayden. By that time the Prime Minister of Cambodia was Hun Sen and he
had been Foreign Minister beforehand. Hayden had met him in Ho Chi Minh
City, but the Hayden initiative ended because the whole of ASEAN objected,
regarding this as an act of total treachery. But Hun Sen remembered it and
regarded it as an act of great courage. So did Vietnam.
So we dreamt up this idea of a United Nations role. It was the change in the Big
Power relationships that made possible what was simply not possible before.
You can only do things that geo-strategic reality will allow you to do. Just having
good ideas and being energetic and vigorous will not make it happen. Yet,
equally, if it had not been for that meeting between Hayden and Hun Sen in Ho
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Chi Minh City we would have had no standing. We would have been seen as
another lackey of the United States. That is how most of the region saw us and,
to a certain extent, still do. It is a fact that whatever political party is in office
in Australia we are going to be a close ally of the United States. That is how
people think about us. Sometimes that is very useful.
Question: Do you think we underestimate American
awareness of Asia?
Popular American awareness of South-east Asia is about zero, but then it is about
zero for the rest of the world. There are people in the United States who are
experts on this part of the world but the United States made no effort to be part
of the East Asia Summit and said to us, ‘go ahead and join’. In 1989 James Baker
was outraged when Hawke first proposed APEC and the United States was not
supposed to be in it. I was at the meeting between Gareth Evans and Jim Baker
when this came up and it was a terrible meeting. But now — I do not think it
is good or bad — the Americans have just got other focuses: the Middle East,
North Asia and Japan. I just think other things are more to the forefront in their
minds and it is a lot harder than it was to get their attention.
That should not alarm us. But I am concerned about this perception that Australia
is a ‘poodle’ of the United States. (I always think these epithets are extremely
unhelpful.) The Coalition parties and the Labor Party do have different
approaches, but the sort of thing that Howard was saying about Labor trashing
the relationship with the United States and giving it a low priority, is completely
wrong. It is also completely wrong for people to say we are behaving like a
poodle by deciding to be close to the United States. We are not.
The Howard Government, quite early in its life, made a calculated decision about
our national interest that the right thing to do would be to be as close as we
possibly could to the United States, the world’s number one economic and
military power, and that was the smart thing to do. Whether it was or it wasn’t,
I do not think they felt like poodles. You might remember that George Bush was
not in office when that decision was made and Bill Clinton was never particularly
nice to John Howard.
So I think these ways of characterising policy towards the United States do not
help very much. People have different views, but there is one coherent view
and that is no matter which political party you are in, with the possible exception
of the Greens, there is a strong commitment to the United States relationship.
The difference may be that there is a much greater willingness on the part of
Labor to have disagreements with them.
The Labor Party is always going to feel more comfortable with a Democratic
president and a Republican government in the United States will feel happier
with a Coalition Government here. They have common political interests and
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common domestic policies in many cases. I do not see why people should see
this as a strange thing. Labor had a perfectly decent relationship with Reagan
and Jim Baker, but there was a much closer relationship with Clinton. This [the
Howard] Government had a perfectly respectable relationship with Clinton as
far as I am aware, but has a very close relationship with its political soul-mate,
the Republican Party.
Conclusion: Idealism and pragmatism
I went to a Lowy Institute seminar which, from left, right and centre, was
basically a ‘Bag Bush’ fest over Iraq. The most common theme was how naïve,
innocent and foolish the Americans were to have this ideal of supporting liberty
around the world: that this could not be a basis for foreign policy; and that in
this world you had to be realistic and promote stability as the key.
Of all people, Robert Manne7  gave a lecture on the importance of the Treaty of
Westphalia which established the principle of national sovereignty. I recall that
the Soviet Union used to quote the Treaty of Westphalia to me when we used
to raise human rights issues with them. Every crummy dictator around the world
used to give us lectures about the principles of mutual respect, sovereignty,
independence and non-interference in internal affairs, the codeword being ‘let
us murder our people without you saying anything’. I was not particularly
persuaded by that argument.
The other idea that was repeatedly referred to was ‘containment’. Couldn’t we
have contained Iraq as we had done successfully with the Soviet Union, went
the argument. Some success — sanctions in Iraq were supposed to contain Iraq,
but became a complete shambles as the Chinese, Russians and especially the
French, cheated on them as fast as they could go. What I had not realised is that
an Australian company was a big cheater too.
People kept quoting the case of the Soviet Union, which they said had been
successfully contained for more than 40 years after World War II, without the
risks we were taking with Iraq. But part of the policy of containment of the
Soviet Union were doctrines called ‘mutually assured destruction’ and ‘extended
deterrence’. Under the principles of containment, it was policy that if the Soviet
Union attacked the United States or Western Europe, or us, or Japan, by
conventional means, the United States would respond with a nuclear attack
which would undoubtedly bring a nuclear attack on the United States and the
rest of us.
It seems to me that this was far less realist, far less cautious or pragmatic and
non-idealistic than anything Bush has ever proposed. Huge risks were taken in
the name of containment, not only in the early 1960s, but in early 1983 when,
during Exercise Archer in Western Europe, the Soviets misread all the signals
and thought the Americans and Western Europeans were about to launch an
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attack on them. So every time I hear that containment was such a moderate,
cautious, sensible policy in pursuit of a great principle — we were not going to
let Western Europe be taken over; we were not going to let the Soviet Union
run large parts of the world — I am reminded that huge risks were taken which,
fortunately, for us all never eventuated.
The pursuit of stability has been a highly sterile policy. It was stability that led
us to support Iraq against Iran.
You have got to have clear ideals — and just because George Bush said it, does
not mean it is not true. His second inaugural address was one of the great modern
speeches you will read. But nobody took any notice of it because it was viewed
through the prism of ‘pre-emption’, Iraq, aggressive cowboy-style language,
language he has the good sense now to regret that he used. If you go back and
read it now, it was fantastic — great ideals, full of humility, but by that time it
was too late. Bush had lost that battle.
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Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, 1996–99
Background
The advent of the Howard Government in March 1996 was very significant in
foreign policy terms because foreign policy was seen as one of the issues that
led to the defeat of the Keating Labor Government. Howard, with Alexander
Downer as his Foreign Minister, brought significant changes to the priorities
and conduct of Australian policy.
Philip Flood was appointed as secretary by the Howard Government at the
beginning of its term of office. He had already had a distinguished career serving
governments of both political persuasions in high-level positions, including as
director-general of the Office of National Assessments (ONA) (1995–96),
director-general of the Australian Agency for International Development
(AusAID) (1993–95) and chief executive officer for Special Trade Representations
(1977–80). He was also Ambassador to Indonesia (1989–93).
During Flood’s secretaryship, the first challenge was to respond to the Howard
Government’s determination to differentiate itself from the foreign policy of its
Australian Labor Party predecessors. In Flood’s term he was involved in
preparation of Australia’s first ever White Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy,
which was notable for confirming the government’s strong preference for
bilateralism over regionalism and multilateralism. A further early challenge was
dealing with the 1997 Asian financial crisis that transformed the region in favour
of China and eventually terminated the Soeharto regime in Indonesia.
Australia’s alliance with the United States would reach new levels of intimacy
and policy convergence. While this reflected Howard’s strong conviction that
the United States would be more, not less, important to Australia, it also occurred
partly through coincidence of events as much as planning. In time, the Howard
Government would also attach high priority to engagement with Australia’s
broader Asia Pacific region; his government would prove highly pro-active in
its nearer region of the South Pacific and East Timor and would bring Australia
into a closer relationship with China.
One of the more serious managerial tasks for DFAT at this time was dealing with
the reductions in the departmental budget and, therefore, staff numbers, directed
by the new government. Despite this challenge, Flood secured strong staff
support for far-reaching changes to employment conditions, bringing much
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greater flexibility to the management of the Department. A significant event
was the Department’s move into new premises designed to meet the special needs
of a foreign ministry, the first time this had been done.
After his term as secretary, Philip Flood was appointed High Commissioner to
the United Kingdom. Subsequently, he conducted several public inquiries for
the Australian Government, including a sensitive inquiry into Australia’s
Intelligence Agencies in 2004.
Flood Presentation: 23 November 2006
Cardinal de Richelieu (Armand Jean du Plessis), the French statesman and cleric,
formed the first distinct foreign ministry in 1626. Since France dominated
European power politics in the century after Richelieu’s death, France’s system
of foreign policy organisation was gradually emulated by other states. Richelieu’s
confidant, the Capuchin friar Père Joseph (born François Le Clerc du Tremblay),
was the diplomat used by the Cardinal in all of the most difficult negotiations
of a critical period that included the Thirty Years’ War. Because of the colour
of his habit, Le Clerc became known as the éminence grise and this term was
subsequently used to describe any unelected power behind a throne.
Papua New Guinea applied the term to me on 19 March 1997. I had been asked
by Australia’s Prime Minister to be his emissary in negotiating with Papua New
Guinea’s Prime Minister the removal of mercenaries from his country’s territory.
The handling of this issue, and its outcome, highlighted an important shift in
the Australian Government’s approach to foreign policy.
On 18 February 1997, the Office of National Assessments had briefed the Prime
Minister and other ministers on the basis of intelligence that the PNG Government
had signed a $36 million contract with a British-based private military
consultancy firm, Sandline International. In entering into this contract — which
was for the supply of arms, training and mercenaries — the PNG Government
had the dual objectives of destroying the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and
reopening the Panguna copper mine on Bougainville. For a long time an
intractable rebellion had been underway there, forcing the closure of the mine
and causing extensive death and suffering.
For Australia, this represented a major foreign policy issue, for several reasons:
• mercenaries were being brought into Australia’s sphere of influence;
• there was considerable risk that the arrangements between the PNG
government and Sandline would bring great instability to our closest
neighbour which, at that time, was receiving over $300 million in civil aid,
as well as substantial defence assistance; and
• many of the up to 10,000 Australian citizens living in PNG would be at risk
if there were to be a breakdown in law and order.
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In response to the ONA briefing, the Prime Minister summoned several ministers
and senior officials — members of the National Security Committee of Cabinet
— and the lines of Australian policy were determined. Broadly speaking, they
were:
• we should aim to stop the mercenaries, then training in Wewak, from
deploying to Bougainville;
• we should then get the mercenaries out of Papua New Guinea;
• the Australian Defence Force should look at options for assisting in this
operation; and
• we should try to achieve our objectives in such a way as to do the least
damage to relations with Papua New Guinea.
The Prime Minister spoke by telephone to PNG’s Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan.
Sir Julius was less than frank about his plans. However, as it happened, there
was to be another opportunity for Australia to sound him out on Sandline’s
activities. Australia’s Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, was due in Port
Moresby on 19 February — the day following the ONA briefing — and while
there he was able to meet face to face with Sir Julius. The essence of his advice
to Downer was that what was taking place in Wewak was no more than the
training of the PNG armed forces.
The two Prime Ministers subsequently met at Kirribilli House, the Prime
Minister’s official residence in Sydney. Again there was no movement in regard
to the substance of the issues that were of concern to Australia.
On Monday 17 March the crisis deepened when, in defiance of his Prime Minister,
Brigadier General Jerry Singirok, Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence
Force, launched an operation — codenamed ‘Rausim Kwik’ — to remove Sandline
from PNG. Singirok ordered the arrest of Tim Spicer, the Sandline chief in PNG,
and then provoked a constitutional crisis by demanding the resignation of his
country’s Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister.
Sir Julius Chan sacked Singirok that same afternoon and appointed an interim
Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force. Singirok refused to budge
and unrest spread in Port Moresby. The Government’s response divided the
army. The police, however, supported the Prime Minister.
On Tuesday 18 March, after consulting the National Security Committee, Prime
Minister Howard told Parliament that:
• Australia supported the elected government of Papua New Guinea (i.e. we
did not support Singirok’s demands for the resignation of ministers);
• Australia remained opposed to PNG’s use of mercenaries; and
• the Australian Government was concerned for the welfare of Australian
citizens at risk of being caught up in the civil unrest.
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On Wednesday 19 March, following further consultations with the National
Security Committee, the Prime Minister telephoned Sir Julius Chan and told him
that the sacking of Singirok had Australia’s support. Howard also asked him if
he would receive me as his personal emissary. Sir Julius, who knew me from
previous negotiations I had conducted with him over aid to PNG, agreed. That
same afternoon, I left for Port Moresby in the Australian Government’s VIP
Falcon jet. I was accompanied by Hugh White, deputy secretary of the
Department of Defence, and Allan Taylor, then with the Prime Minister’s
Department.1  Allan Taylor is an outstanding diplomat and Hugh White is
Australia’s foremost authority on defence and strategic policy. When in the air,
Hugh prudently observed that we could not be sure we would be able to land
should troops loyal to Singirok choose to intervene. Fortunately, this proved
not to be a problem.
I met Sir Julius the next morning, in his office on the fourth floor of PNG’s
Parliament House. Australia’s High Commissioner, David Irvine, joined my
colleagues and me. Sir Julius was accompanied by the head of his department,
Noel Levi. Sir Julius had contributed much to PNG and this was his second term
as Prime Minister. He had also been PNG’s first Finance Minister following
independence. An arresting-looking man, with features drawn from his Chinese
father and New Ireland mother, Chan was a strong nationalist. Hardworking
and competent, he was also autocratic and aloof.
I told Sir Julius that, if he did not abandon the idea of using mercenaries,
Australia would take drastic action and that it would affect both the aid program
and the Defence Cooperation Program. He was taken aback. He was then offered
additional assistance if he walked away from the Sandline deal. Eventually he
tried to bargain. ‘Perhaps Australia might like to pay for the mercenaries?’ I said
no. There was a total deadlock. The meeting broke up after some hours and I
returned to our hotel. That evening Sir Julius’s office telephoned to advise that
he was reviewing his position and would see me in the morning.
On Friday 21 March he told me that he was suspending the Sandline contract
while he set up a judicial inquiry and, most importantly, that the Sandline
mercenaries would start leaving PNG that afternoon. My party flew out of Port
Moresby later that day. Mr Howard met us in Sydney and he announced the
outcome. The events surrounding the Sandline affair led to Sir Julius Chan’s
resignation on 26 March and the end of his political career.
The immediate outcomes of our negotiations were:
• (of course) the withdrawal of the mercenaries from PNG;
• the upholding of the integrity of the PNG constitution (in other words, the
military commander Jerry Singirok neither determined the civilian
government nor took control himself); and
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• the opening up of new opportunities to address the problems in Bougainville.
The Howard Government’s approach to this crisis marked a departure in
Australia’s South Pacific policy — breaking the mould in terms of official
forbearance towards PNG and demonstrating a willingness to be more proactive
in the region. The resolution of the crisis demonstrated Australia’s capacity to
bring considerable leverage to bear in regional diplomacy.
The handling of the events of early 1997 also demonstrated the importance of
the National Security Committee (NSC) in the Government’s approach to foreign,
defence and security policy. Like Hawke, but unlike Whitlam, Keating, Blair or
Bush, Howard is a cabinet traditionalist who cares strongly about orderly cabinet
process. Accordingly, the NSC, which John Howard has called ‘one of the very
significant successes of the Government in terms of governance arrangements’,
is a key cabinet function under the Howard Government. The NSC has also given
the Prime Minister a strong grip on the details of foreign, defence and security
policy and, under Howard, has had a broader agenda than any comparable
committee used by any of his predecessors.
I had the privilege of being secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade at the time of a new government with different ideas about foreign and
trade policy. Changes of government have occurred on only four occasions in
the past 50 years. Other secretaries who had the experience of guiding the
Department as it adjusted to a new government were Sir Keith Waller in 1972,
Alan Renouf in 1975 and Peter Henderson in 1983.
In a broad sense Howard and Downer came to government with an assessment
of Australia’s place in the international community that was similar to the
perspective of the Hawke and Keating governments. All held an optimistic view
of Australia as a leading middle power with the capacity to influence events.
All believed that Australia — while of course lacking the strength upon which
a great power can draw in order to impose its will — is large enough and clever
enough to advance specific interests in key areas.
But beyond this similarity, much about foreign and trade policy changed with
the advent of the new government. Howard and Downer changed substantially
the direction of Australia’s foreign and strategic policy. They brought to
government a very different perspective on major power relations, a different
view of Australia’s relationship with the United States, a different perception
of other major bilateral relations, a different approach to trade and to the
environment, and a different assessment of what the United Nations and other
multilateral institutions should be tasked to achieve.
John Howard brought, in particular, a more expansive and optimistic view of
the influence of the United States and a conviction that the United States and
Australia are destined to grow more important to each other. He wanted strong
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links with Japan, China and Indonesia but he would never use Keating’s narrow,
if confident, construction, ‘Australia must find its security in Asia, not from
Asia’.2  Howard came to office respectful of Indonesia but less enamoured than
Keating became with Indonesia’s President Suharto. A passionate believer in
parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, Howard was always going to have
more reservations about Suharto. In a conversation shortly after his election,
and following a successful first meeting with Malaysia’s Prime Minster, Dr
Mahathir, the Prime Minister discussed with me his approach to foreign leaders.
He remarked: ‘We are proud to be Australian, proud of our culture and traditions
— we do not grovel to foreign leaders. I will be defiantly Australian without
being gauche or provocative.’
One of Alexander Downer’s early decisions was to issue the White Paper on
Foreign and Trade Policy.3  I would like to say that this was done on my
recommendation, but it was not. Downer personally took this initiative and, at
the time, I reflected how strange it was that his two energetic and capable
predecessors — Hayden and Evans — had not done so. Downer set up an
advisory committee, consisting of business people, a former Prime Minister,
former policy advisers and academics to give him additional advice.
One of the best decisions I made was to agree to the request of Peter Varghese,
the present Director-General of ONA, that he be in charge of the secretariat
charged with drafting the text of the White Paper. Downer drove the process
personally and, given the closeness between his strategic vision and that of the
Prime Minister, it was not a difficult matter for the Foreign Minister to secure
cabinet endorsement for his text.
The White Paper acknowledged elements of continuity between governments
and noted ‘the priority accorded to the Asia Pacific and, especially, to the
countries of East Asia, the forging of close relationships with the United States,
Japan, Indonesia and China, the commitment to further trade liberalisation and
strong support for the World Trade Organisation and APEC’.4 The document
further set out four strategic priorities:
• The Government will apply a basic national interest test to its foreign
and trade policy: does it advance the security, jobs and standard of
living of Australians?
• Australia has global interests that require an active foreign and trade
policy, of broad scope. In terms of this policy, the Asia Pacific is the
highest priority.
• Bilateral relationships will be the principal means of advancing
Australia’s interests, and will be the basic building blocks for
effective regional and global strategies.
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• Australia will adopt a more selective approach to multilateral issues
and must concentrate its multilateral efforts in those areas where
Australia’s security and economic interests are closely engaged.
The following brief extracts from the White Paper give a sense of its flavour:
• Australia’s foreign and trade policy is about advancing the interests
of Australia and Australians …
• The United States will remain, over the next 15 years, the single most
powerful country in the world. The Government’s judgment is that
the United States will also continue to see its best interests being
served by maintaining its strategic engagement in East Asia … The
strategic engagement and commitment [of the United States]
underwrites the stability of East Asia …
• China’s economic growth, with attendant confidence and enhanced
influence, will be the most important strategic development of the
next 15 years. How China manages its economic growth and pursues
its international objectives, and how other nations, particularly the
United States and Japan, respond to China will be crucial …
• Australia’s strong links to Europe and the United States … enhance
Australia’s value to East Asia … Australia does not need to choose
between its history and its geography …
• Australia must be realistic about what multilateral institutions such
as the United Nations system can deliver …
• Central to the strategies in this paper is adopting a whole-of-nation
approach which emphasises the linkages between domestic policies
and foreign and trade policies.
Behind the words in the White Paper were many nuances of difference with the
previous government. One of the document’s underlying messages was that
Australia should be proud of its unique identity and that our neighbours should
value us for what we are: a responsible, constructive and practical nation with
remarkable achievements in medicine, agriculture, mining, education, law and,
not least, in governance and public administration.
Howard and Downer had a more positive view than their predecessors with
regard to Australia’s relationship with Britain. This was no yearning for an
Anglo-Celtic past. Neither had any illusions that Britain would stand up within
the European Community when issues with the potential to affect Australia’s
agricultural interests arose, but both had greater respect than Keating for what
Britain represented and what it could bring to the international table. Both also
valued highly Australia’s military and intelligence links with Britain.
Similarly, Downer had no illusions about France’s capacity to play an
idiosyncratic role in global affairs but he was much more convinced than his
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predecessors had been about the importance of keeping France — indeed Europe
— engaged in the South Pacific. He shared with Paul Keating an affection for
French culture, but drew different conclusions about France’s approach to its
territories in the Pacific.
On China, the White Paper sent a clear message to Australians: they should
understand that China will be a powerful force in our region and a powerful
factor affecting the fortunes of Australia. The policy rejected the ‘China threat’
view, which had taken hold in some influential quarters in the United States.
Americans had been debating, and still debate, whether the United States should
see China as a strategic competitor or a strategic partner.
In its very early months the Howard Government took a less nuanced approach
to China. Responding to a temporary crisis over the Taiwan Straits, Australia
gave prompt and strong diplomatic support for American naval manoeuvres
intended to reassure Taiwan. In July 1996 the ‘Sydney Statement’ was issued
following the Australia-United States ministerial talks (AUSMIN). China wrongly
interpreted this statement as a manifestation of Australian involvement in a US
policy of containment. A change in each country’s perception began when the
Prime Minister met China’s President, Jiang Zemin, at the APEC forum in
November that year, and both agreed to exchange head of government visits.
Prime Minister Howard’s first visit to China, in March 1997, marked a major
turning point in his approach to Sino-Australian relations. I had been asked to
go ahead and clear the way for a changed approach on several issues. Howard’s
visit was an outstanding success and laid the foundation for a more strategic
relationship and for subsequent commercial achievements.
In addition to its positions in respect of specific bilateral relationships, the White
Paper gave priority to reforming the treaty making process so as to provide for
greater transparency and accountability. Downer also had new ideas about
foreign aid policy and he set about changing Australia’s aid program. He had
strong views about consular matters as well. On my first day as secretary he
made it clear that he wanted consular matters to have a higher standing in the
department and he wished to be personally involved in any significant consular
issue.
On the issue of race, the White Paper delivered a strong, principled and
unambiguous statement:
Central to the values to which the Government gives expression is an
unqualified commitment to racial equality and to eliminating racial
discrimination … The rejection of racial discrimination is not only a
moral issue, it is fundamental to our acceptance by, and engagement
with, the region where our vital security and economic interests lie.
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Racial discrimination is not only morally repugnant, it repudiates
Australia’s best interests.
The issue of race had become a substantive problem for the Foreign Affairs and
Trade portfolio because of statements made by the newly elected member of
parliament, Pauline Hanson. On 10 September 1996 she had told the Parliament
that ‘Australia is in danger of being swamped by Asians …’ Hanson revived a
false image of Australia as a nation opposed to Asian immigration and to strong
links with Asia. She also had a warped idea of evidence. She coined the term
‘book facts’ for the evidence that could be found in books. When challenged to
support her assertion that one million illegal immigrants were entering Australia
each year, via New Zealand, she replied: ‘But you are just asking for “book
facts”. We don’t need “book facts”: we know it is happening’. I found her
statements on race offensive and, much more importantly, so did Alexander
Downer and Tim Fischer, the Minister for Trade. Both portfolio ministers spoke
out courageously against Pauline Hanson’s views.
The racial aspect of Hanson’s speeches was doing Australia damage in a number
of Asian capitals and I had several lengthy disagreements with the Prime
Minister’s office. The Prime Minister had broader political concerns on other
issues and these influenced his handling of Hanson. On 8 May 1997, eight months
after Hanson’s offensive speech in the Parliament, he included an excellent
statement on race in the speech he made at a dinner in Sydney to launch the
Australian Centre of the Asia Society. He said:
She cannot have it both ways. She enjoys freedom to express her views.
Equally, she has to be accountable for those views. She cannot evade
responsibility for the consequences of her statements … She is wrong
when she says that Australia is being swamped by Asians. She is wrong
to seek scapegoats for society’s problems. She is wrong when she
denigrates foreign investment, because its withdrawal would cost
Australian jobs. She is wrong when she says Australia is headed for civil
war.
At the dinner the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, Grahame Morris, came across
to me immediately after the speech and said, ‘Are you satisfied now, Philip?’, I
replied that the Prime Minister’s statement was admirable but that — from a
foreign policy perspective — it was several months too late.
On trade policy, the new Government was highly committed to APEC and to
continuing multilateral reform, but placed more emphasis on bilateral
negotiations. The Minister for Trade, Tim Fischer, similarly placed a greater
emphasis on bilateral trade marketing.
The integration of Trade functions within a combined Foreign Affairs and Trade
portfolio had been a decision of the Hawke Government in 1987. The shift
75
Philip Flood, AO
reflected the greater integration of political and economic activities
internationally, the growing priority accorded economic issues with the passing
of the intensity of the Cold War and continually evolving linkages between
domestic and foreign policies. The merging of the two departments also reflected
a more strategic approach to public administration.
As Minister for Trade, Tim Fischer introduced an annual Trade Outcomes and
Objectives Statement. This was a vehicle for monitoring the effects of efforts to
open up markets and for ensuring that trade policy and promotion efforts
adequately responded to changing circumstances.
The most important issue the Howard Government had to deal with after those
addressed by the White Paper was the collapse of South-East Asian economies.
The crisis began on 2 July 1997, when the Thai Government floated the baht.
This course of action followed months of pressure from speculators and was
undertaken only after the Thai Government had drained the entire reserves of
the country’s central bank in a futile effort to defend the currency. Then, like
a virus, the contagion spread to neighbouring economies — the pressures
associated with growth had become too great for the institutional structures of
these countries to cope with. Within a year the economies of the countries most
affected — Thailand, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines —
had shrunk by 18 per cent. Millions of people were plunged back into poverty.
Australia responded generously. Australia and Japan were the only countries
to contribute to all three bail-out plans (for Thailand, Indonesia and Korea) by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with Alexander Downer also playing a
critical role in softening the IMF’s approach to Indonesia. This involved a blunt
showdown between Downer and the US Treasury. And the fact that Australia
weathered the crisis influenced the way in which South-East Asia and other
regions looked at this country.
As a young Departmental officer having returned from my first posting, I had
the privilege of serving for two years as Executive Assistant to the then secretary
of the Department, Sir Arthur Tange. Like many others, I admired Tange’s
intellect, integrity and work ethic, his sense of fairness, his forthright manner
and his belief in a distinctively Australian approach to foreign policy and
diplomacy. He wanted a department that was vigorous and creative in serving
the government of the day. During the time I worked for him, Tange served two
ministers: Sir Garfield Barwick and then Paul Hasluck. Both were highly
intelligent, hardworking and dedicated to advancing Australia’s interests as
they saw them. Their differences were instructive.
Garfield Barwick was frank and open with Tange, courteous and trusting,
relishing open debate and quickly coming to clear conclusions on the issues at
hand. Both minister and secretary understood fully the other’s role and
prerogatives. Tange was never involved in party politics but he made it his
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business to understand thoroughly the wider parliamentary and domestic political
context in which Barwick had to function. Tange was never subservient and he
had the confidence to argue forcefully against what he saw as poor policy.
Paul Hasluck was a fine historian and poet and was widely read. But, in contrast
to Barwick, Hasluck could be suspicious, querulous, frequently remote,
sometimes rude, resentful when queried about a decision, and intrusive in matters
of departmental administration with which a minister would not normally be
engaged. He kept oral communication with his secretary to a minimum, preferring
the exchange of written notes. Hasluck wrote exceptionally well but, since he
was not always frank, his notes often failed to compensate for the want of candid
discussion.
The mutually respectful, friendly and open relationship between Barwick and
Tange seemed to me then, and still does now, the best possible example of a
relationship between minister and secretary. It is the kind of relationship most
likely to advance the government’s and the minister’s interests and most likely
to be conducive to good governance. As secretary, I was fortunate to have such
a relationship with both Alexander Downer and Tim Fischer.
Both ministers wanted, in addition to virtually daily contact with me, a regular
weekly dialogue with the department’s senior executive, in those weeks when
they were not overseas. Mostly, I had separate meetings with the two ministers,
but on occasion they would hold a joint meeting, including also the portfolio’s
two parliamentary secretaries. What both ministers sought from me and my
colleagues were ideas, suggestions and robust debate about options. As secretary,
I travelled mostly with the Prime Minister, but I also accompanied Alexander
Downer on his first visit to South-East Asia and went to South Asia with Tim
Fischer.
Fischer did not bring to the portfolio the inside knowledge of policy that Downer
had, but he did bring a remarkable array of high-level friendships around Asia,
developed as a result of his love of travel in the region, his prodigious memory
for names, his personal warmth and his empathy with many Asian cultures. He
also knew something of Latin America. As Deputy Prime Minister and Leader
of the National Party, and as the devoted father of two young boys, he had
exceptional demands on his time outside of his portfolio responsibilities.
Many observers took longer than they should have to appreciate that Fischer
was shrewd and calculating, with an unusual ability — as he demonstrated to
his cabinet colleagues and to other Trade ministers — to persuade others of his
point of view (beware of Tim Fischer when he tells you that a situation is
‘win-win’!). Fischer showed political courage and conviction in resisting his
party on agricultural protection (and on gun ownership). He showed leadership
— unquestionably controversial in the eyes of dedicated multilateralists — in
his preference for bilateral approaches to international trade relations. He much
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preferred oral debate to long submissions and I was fortunate to have experienced
trade deputies in Peter Grey and Joanna Hewitt,5  both of whom excelled in
extempore explanations of complex issues. Fischer was also exceptionally well
served by Jenelle Bonnor on his staff.
While Fischer was Deputy Prime Minister, Downer was the senior portfolio
minister and took the final decision on broad strategic directions, portfolio
budget matters and diplomatic appointments. Downer had the advantage of
having worked in the department as a diplomat for several years before pursuing
his private sector and, then, political, career. He knew the department had a lot
of talent and he knew what a well-directed department could accomplish.
In his first months as Foreign Minister, the media misjudged Downer. Many
were convinced he would stumble. Even the conservative columnist Piers
Akerman6  forecast that before the year was out Downer would be posted to
The Hague. Downer soon demonstrated to the media, however, that he was more
than ‘a dedicated Tory’ (to use his term) and robust party politician. Those like
me who had never worked with him previously found out quickly that he is
passionately dedicated to advancing Australia’s interests, highly intelligent,
forthright, courageous, strategic and especially well read in history and
economics. His knowledge in these areas had been as well concealed as Bill
Hayden’s knowledge of philosophy and art. Downer was particularly well served
at that time by Greg Hunt [later to become a Parliamentary Secretary in the
Howard government] and by Bill Farmer,7  John Dauth8  and the other deputy
secretaries.
In some previous governments, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
had played second fiddle to the Department of Defence on broad strategic issues.
In the Howard government, Downer dominated this area.
To lead a major Commonwealth department and be the minister’s principal
adviser on all important policy and strategic issues, a secretary has, in my view,
five important tasks. He or she should:
• ensure that the Department has in place a set of well-understood goals and
objectives;
• foster a collegial system for considering all current major policy issues and
for anticipating future issues and opportunities;
• establish an appropriate pattern of delegation of responsibility, with
accompanying accountability implications;
• make sure the Department has a well-understood management philosophy
and an appropriate and effective allocation among divisions; and




Unquestionably, the major task for the secretary is running the department and
inspiring departmental staff as they serve portfolio ministers. There are a host
of other tasks: developing good relations with all parliamentarians concerned
with foreign and trade policy and developing in particular a good working
rapport with the relevant parliamentary committees; being accessible, subject
to ministerial wishes, to the media, the business community and the academy;
receiving foreign delegations; maintaining effective relations with the local
diplomatic corps; and, last but not least, serving the Governor-General of the
day by providing access to relevant information and, if required, material for
use in speeches.
When I became secretary, the stated aim of the department, as set out in its
Corporate Plan, was: ‘To win a future for Australia in the world’. There is an
element of idealism reflected in this aim, but also a streak of uncertainty and
pessimism that was out of touch with the Howard Government’s optimism and
pragmatism. I changed this text to: ‘To advance the interests of Australia and
Australians internationally’.
The department’s stated goals were also changed. The first goal became: ‘To
enhance Australia’s security’. A previous goal, ‘To advance Australia’s standing
as a good international citizen’, was changed to: ‘To strengthen global cooperation
in ways which advance Australia’s interests’. Highlighting Downer’s strong
commitment to give greater emphasis to consular issues, the goal of helping
Australians overseas was changed to: ‘To help Australian travellers and
Australians overseas’. A new goal was added, reflected in the issuing of the 1997
White Paper: ‘To promote public understanding of Australia’s foreign and trade
policy’. The framework of the Corporate Plan that I established in 1997 is, in
terms of its stated aim and goals, still largely unchanged today.
A corporate plan as such has limited usefulness. However, the process of
developing such a document and debating the relevant issues with senior and
junior departmental staff is a valuable way of ensuring that the goals and
objectives of a government are understood by the department as a whole.
I was fortunate as secretary to inherit the opening of the department’s new
building, which had been planned by the previous Government and, especially,
by Gareth Evans. The opening by the Prime Minister was attended by four
previous prime ministers: Sir John Gorton, Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser and
Bob Hawke. Two brilliant tapestries by the Victorian Tapestry Workshop were
commissioned for display in the entrance foyer. The work, based on John Olsen’s
painting Rising Suns over Australia Felix reflects the building’s confident
nationalism. The other work, Wamungu — My Mother’s Country, based on the




The government had decided that the new building should be named the R.G.
Casey Building, to honour Australia’s then longest-serving foreign minister.
Downer and Fischer readily agreed with my proposal that the selection of names
for areas within the building should be made on a bipartisan basis and should
also acknowledge the separate origins of the Department of Trade. Thus the
department houses the H.V. Evatt Library, the Gareth Evans Theatrette and the
J.D. Anthony Conference Room. There are meeting rooms named after former
secretaries Sir John Crawford, William Hodgson, Atlee Hunt, Jim Scully, Sir
Arthur Tange and Sir Alan Westerman. There is also the (Sir James) Plimsoll
Dining Room. The street in front of the building is John McEwen Crescent,
named in honour of Australia’s longest-serving trade minister.
I felt it was important that, unlike the department’s previous homes, this new
building should convey a sense of Australia’s history and remarkable artistic
heritage. I commissioned a talented officer to assemble from the archives of the
department, the National Library of Australia and major newspapers, a collection
of photographs illustrating Australia’s diplomatic history. Photographs from
this collection are today a feature on virtually all of the Casey Building’s walls.
Antonia Syme, of Artbank, and my wife, Carole, helped ensure that original
paintings by Australian artists are displayed in all significant rooms.
Given the demands associated with posting families overseas and with managing
up to 90 overseas posts, the department has for a long time had in place a
well-developed system of personnel administration. The dismantling of the old
‘closed shop’ culture of the department was begun by Sir Keith Waller and Mick
Shann in the 1970s. The process was completed when Stuart Harris was secretary.
During his term, when the former Department of Trade was amalgamated with
the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1987, all systems were extensively reviewed
and a conceptual framework for integrating foreign policy and trade policy
issues was introduced.
Many outstanding people — including David Hay, Peter Henderson, David
Goss, Frank Murray, Joanna Hewitt and a legion of others — have contributed
to the well-deserved reputation for integrity and fairness enjoyed by DFAT’s
personnel system. In earlier years, the department had been slow to recruit
women and even slower to promote them to senior levels. This situation had
changed well before I became secretary. My contribution was to recommend
more women for appointment as heads of mission than had ever previously been
charged with this role.
More than one minister in the first Howard Government — but not Downer,
Fischer or the Prime Minister — would cheerfully have outsourced diplomatic
missions to the private sector if he felt this was feasible. No country of any
significance (indeed, as far as I know, no country) has done this. The model of
diplomatic missions managed by government has endured for hundreds of years,
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across cultures and countries, and has survived because it has been able to adapt
effectively to dramatic changes in the international landscape and, in recent
years, to profound changes in technology.
One very regrettable budgetary event during the first Howard Government
concerned ownership of the Casey Building. The Minister of Finance was
successful in persuading his colleagues — against the advice of Downer and
Fischer — that the department’s headquarters building should be sold to the
Motor Trades Association of Australia. I remonstrated strongly with the Minister
of Finance that this was an absurd proposal. It virtually guaranteed a
private-sector owner access to monopoly rents after a grace period, since it was
not practical for a foreign ministry to shop around for new locations, not least
because of its communications installations. My representations were not
successful.
Another complex issue brought on by budgetary pressures concerned journalists
from the old Australian Information Service. They had joined the department,
in most cases against their own wishes, as part of portfolio changes in 1987. My
predecessor had sensibly started the process of reducing the number of journalists
within the Department. I failed to see why, in the Internet age, the department
needed 50 journalists to collate and distribute factual and positive information
about Australia to the governments and media of other countries. One of the
doyens of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, Wallace Brown, described as
‘draconian and short-sighted’ my view that there was more useful work the
officers could do in the department or in the private sector. The majority of the
Press Gallery evidently disagreed, since Brown’s campaign failed and the decision
was quickly accepted as sound public administration.
In 1997 I successfully negotiated a far-reaching Certified Agreement with the
department’s staff. This meant: major changes to salaries and the introduction
of broad-banded salary classifications and salary packaging; a new system of
performance pay and performance assessment; the elimination of centrally
imposed restrictions on working hours, together with the old rules on increments
and higher duties allowances; more streamlined procedures for dealing with
inefficient or recalcitrant officers; and the introduction of formal arrangements
for permanent part-time work, job sharing and home-based work.
In effect, these changes represented a first-time opportunity to gear employment
conditions to the department’s specific needs. In a secret ballot, the Agreement
was approved by an overwhelming majority of staff. The changes were to bring
less administration, enhanced organisational flexibility and a greater chance for
staff to earn more through high performance. In addition, the department took
over full responsibility for overseas allowances and conditions of service —
issues that had been a continual source of frustration for over 50 years. This last
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set of changes was the culmination of a process to ensure that managers were
responsible for the financial costs of their decisions.
The career paths of all of the Department’s secretaries are remarkable for their
diversity. Before I joined the Department, I studied economic statistics and
mathematics at University and worked for three years for a major insurance
company — studying to become an actuary.
I served six Coalition and three Labor governments. Successive Labor prime
ministers appointed me as High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Ambassador to
Indonesia and director-general of the Office of National Assessments. The present
Government appointed me as secretary of DFAT. I had much earlier been
appointed by the Coalition as Chief Executive for Special Trade Negotiations. It
is one of the greatest privileges in Australia to be secretary of the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. For me it was the most professionally fulfilling
role in 43 years of public service.
ENDNOTES
1 Taylor, originally from Foreign Affairs, was First Assistant Secretary, International Division,
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
2 This statement was made in a speech entitled, ‘Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism’ that Keating
gave at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore on 17 January 1996.
3  Entitled In the National Interest, it was published in 1997.
4  APEC is the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, set up in 1989 at the initiative of Australia
and Japan under Bob Hawke’s Prime Ministership.
5  Joanna Hewitt was later appointed Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
(2004–07).
6  Columnist for the News Limited Sydney newspaper, The Daily Telegraph.
7  Bill Farmer was later appointed Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
(1998–2005).
8  John Dauth was subsequently Australian Ambassador to the United Nations in New York (2001–06).
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Epilogue: ‘The job is never done’
John Butcher
In his prologue, Trevor Wilson observes that the period covered by the tenure
of the five former DFAT secretaries encompassed times of ‘intense and relentless
public stress’ for the department. During the years 1979–99, the application of
‘new public management’, with its emphases on performance, accountability
and responsiveness, led to major transformations in the way Australian
governments do business. The profound cultural changes wrought in the
Australian Public Service (APS) over this period shaped the institutional and
operational platform from which their successors, Dr Ashton Calvert (who served
as secretary from 1998–2006) and Michael L’Estrange (the current DFAT
secretary), would grapple with a volatile post-9/11 foreign and domestic policy
environment defined, in part, by the ‘War on Terror’ (Bali, Iraq and David
Hicks), failed or faltering regional states (East Timor, the Solomon Islands and
Fiji) and global issues of the moment such as climate change (Kyoto and emissions
trading), food security and energy security.
In response to a question put to him by a journalist at a 2 June 2008 press
conference about rumoured ‘policy paralysis’ in the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, the Foreign Minister, the Hon. Stephen Smith, replied:
[I]n a job like this, the job's never done. The work is never complete.
The job is never done. And so I frankly don't pay much attention to
what anonymous people might regard as a snapshot of a working day.
The job is never done in this business. And in the end, the Australian
people will make a judgement about whether the foreign policy that we
adopted, and the public policy that we adopted, was ultimately for
Australia's national interest.1
‘The job is never done.’ The minister’s words have a truth and resonance with
which both current and former secretaries of DFAT would surely agree. While
the structural and systemic reforms of the Hawke-Keating and Howard
governments surely transformed the operational culture and leadership style of
the department, that transformation has on-going repercussions. If there is a
truism about public administration, it is that stasis is illusory or, at best,
temporary.
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Ashton Calvert — punctilious professional and courageous
thinker
In a media release on the occasion of the untimely death in November 2007 of
former secretary Dr Ashton Calvert AC, then Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Alexander Downer, remarked:
Ashton Calvert’s leadership of DFAT at a time of immense change and
challenge in the international environment was his crowning
achievement. Through his personal example and the standards he set,
Ashton upheld clarity of focus and the highest standards of governance
in the work of the department, while simultaneously delivering strong
policy outcomes for Australia across a broad range of foreign policy and
trade issues.2
Downer went on to say that Dr Calvert was ‘frank and fearless in the best
tradition of Australia’s distinguished public service’. Downer’s opinion was
indeed shared by some on the other side of politics. The late Peter Cook, who
was Trade Minister in the Keating government from 1993–94 and, later, professor
at Curtin University, observed of Calvert before his death:
Dr Calvert is a true foreign affairs professional. He is, as well, an
exemplary public servant. You couldn't have served both the Keating
Government as a Senior Advisor and the Howard Government as
Secretary of the Department in positions of absolute trust unless you
were anything short of being exemplary. In my experience Dr Calvert
offers fearless advice and then conscientiously implements the decisions
that are taken by the government. I think his own view is, which is both
frightening and reassuring for ministers, is that ministers should get all
the credit for what they do and they should get all the blame as well.3
Paul Keating’s biographer, Don Watson, described Aston Calvert as ‘an astute,
punctilious professional of undisguised ambition and a streak of zeal’ who, as
advisor on international affairs, had earned Keating’s respect as ‘a good and
courageous thinker’ (Watson 2002: 71; 406). Keating himself said of Calvert that
he was ‘an outstanding diplomat’ with a ‘hard-headed, take-no-prisoner approach
to international affairs’.4
It is ironic, therefore, that Graeme Dobell5 , in a 2003 critique of what he termed
a culture of ‘diplomatic compliance’ in DFAT on Calvert’s watch, asserted:
… self-censorship has become an ambassadorial art form; well-understood
protocols ensure ministers are not told what they don’t want to hear and




Dobell’s article laments the impact on the ‘ethos of DFAT’ of the ‘series of
revolutions imposed on the public service by the Hawke-Keating and Howard
governments’ aimed at transforming its management culture (Dobell 2003: 69).
Of course, Dobell is not alone in his fears that the capacity to offer considered
and impartial policy advice has been compromised by a heightened emphasis
on ‘responsiveness’ to government. Here it should be noted that the principle
of ‘responsiveness’ is enshrined in the APS Values in the Public Service Act 1999
in the following terms:
the APS is responsive to the Government in providing frank, honest,
comprehensive, accurate and timely advice and in implementing the
Government’s policies and programs (S9, Part 3, 10(f)).
The concern, as expressed by Dobell, seems to be that ‘responsiveness’, in the
case of DFAT, has tipped into political compliance and, even, complicity.
Such concerns are not exclusive to DFAT. A number of commentators hold that
the qualities of ‘frank and fearless’ have long been in decline across the APS.
Indeed, in a recent ANZSOG monograph, Whatever Happened to Frank and
Fearless? The impact of new public management on the Australian Public Service,
Kathy MacDermott clinically examines the evidence for such a decline and comes
to similar conclusions. It is not, however, my purpose here to digress into a
critique of the evolving relationship between the administrative and executive
arms of government in Australia — others have done that capably and at length
elsewhere. Instead, I wish to briefly explore from the perspective of the players
themselves, the principal operational (as opposed to policy) challenges facing
DFAT in the contemporary era.
Calvert himself — perhaps owing to the ‘clarity and focus’ of which Downer
spoke — well understood the practical operational challenges faced by a
department like DFAT. Dobell, citing Calvert, portrayed the ‘realpolitik’ within
which departmental secretaries now work:
The man at the centre of DFAT, the secretary, Ashton Calvert, argues
there was never a public service golden age: ‘The implication seems to
be that there was some previous period when public servants were free
to decide things themselves, which is not what I recall. I don’t think it
would be healthy or democratic if that were the case.’ He agrees there
has been cultural change but sees it more as a response to staff cuts,
technological change and the complexity of issues modern government
confronts. Foreign Affairs must be more of a team player in a
whole-of-government process: ‘We most certainly are much better
integrated and better embedded in the broader public service than
before’. (Dobell 2003: 72-73)
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Of course, Calvert, at different points in his career, walked both sides of the
fence, first as a foreign policy adviser to former Prime Minister Paul Keating and
then as a bureaucrat. In some respects, the shift from political insider to
government official might have seemed to him rather constraining. In his book,
Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, Keating (2000) draws a clear
distinction between the modus operandi of a policy adviser and a departmental
secretary:
Next to the foreign minister, the adviser's job is, I believe, the second
most important in the Australian foreign policy firmament. Free of the
administrative burden which the secretaryship of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade has, the adviser's job is principally about policy. But
unlike most policy jobs, it carries with it the live conduit of power.
(emphasis added)6
The transition from the role of policy advisor to departmental secretary might
have been a difficult one, both for Calvert and the man who succeeded him,
Michael L’Estrange, owing to the ‘administrative burden’ of which Keating
speaks. Not only is the secretary expected to advise the minister and the
government in relation to a complex and dynamic policy frontier, he/she is
required to offer clear executive leadership and governance oversight in a
department with over 3000 staff (including almost 1500 staff recruited overseas);
a budget appropriation of over $832 million; and non-financial assets valued at
over $1.5 billion.7  In addition, the department contains seven portfolio agencies
and administers 38 principal Acts. If secretaries are accorded less freedom to
wander the policy landscape, it is because their responsibilities are larger and
more diverse while their accountabilities are more pointed. While the popular
perception of the secretary’s role may have been shaped by ‘Yes Minister’
caricatures of British Permanent secretaries effectively running their own foreign
policy agendas in parallel to those of the government, such is not — and has,
perhaps, never been — the case in Australia. More to the point, senior executives’
‘accountability for performance’ has certainly been heightened over the course
of the last 25 years of public sector reform.
In a 1999 speech on ‘The role of DFAT at the turn of the Century’, Calvert
observed that economic globalisation played a part in transforming the way
DFAT does its work:
The Australian economy is now more open, internationally oriented and
competitive than ever before.
As a consequence, more and more Australian companies of various sizes
are increasingly engaged in international trade in an increasing number
of foreign markets in an ever-widening range of products and services.
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This means, of course, a bigger, not a smaller, role for DFAT in helping
these companies by negotiating improved market access for Australian
products and services either through the WTO or bilaterally, and by
working with other governments to streamline procedures, harmonise
standards and better manage quarantine arrangements.8
In addition, he noted that advances in information technology had ‘produced a
totally new dynamic in the international dissemination of policy-relevant
information and proposals’ with the result ‘that many processes of bilateral and
multilateral negotiations that were hitherto handled quietly by governments
behind closed doors are now subject to virtually immediate scrutiny by informed
groups in relevant countries’. He added that ‘[t]hese developments are certainly
not something that DFAT resists’ and drew attention to his department’s efforts
to make its website ‘attractive and useful to the general public’. He also
acknowledged that, in keeping with the main currents of contemporary public
sector management, the ‘[d]isciplines of transparency, accountability and policy
contestability are very healthy for an organisation like DFAT’.
With respect to the operational and budgetary challenges faced by the
department under his stewardship, he observed that much of the Department's
management reform work had been:
… concentrated on finding savings, for example, through judicious
thinning of our overseas positions, including through replacement by
locally employed staff .
At home, we have targeted our internal administrative practices,
delivering important savings through streamlining and some outsourcing.
We have been able to use to real advantage the new flexibility available
to departments under the Government's public-service reforms.
We now have the ability to set our own conditions, for example in
relation to overseas terms and conditions for our staff.
Another area of opportunity has been the freedom that agencies now
have in agreement-making to set the pay and other employment
conditions for all staff.9
Calvert remarked that DFAT, in 1999, was ‘clearly different from the former
Department of Foreign Affairs before its amalgamation with the Department of
Trade in 1987’ and drew attention to ‘the new emphasis that is now given to
delivering practical services to a range of Australian clients beyond the
Government itself’ as well as to ‘meeting the policy challenges we face in a
modern, dynamic and effective way’.
In a June 2001 speech at a ceremony to launch the DFAT display in Canberra
for the centenary of the Australian Public Service, he alluded to the stereotypes
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of the foreign service portrayed in the media and drew attention to what he
considered ‘the acid test for the department’:
That is, the work that we do providing passports for Australians to travel
overseas and helping Australians who run into problems abroad. To put
this in perspective, in 1999–2000 3.3 million Australians travelled abroad.
Over the same period, we issued almost 1.15 million passports. That’s
one every 27 seconds. Each year DFAT assists more than 20,000
Australians in serious difficulty through our consular network of more
than 150 points of service throughout the world. And over the past three
years alone, DFAT staff in Canberra and on the ground have coordinated
major efforts to ensure the safety of Australians affected by civil unrest
in Indonesia and East Timor, Fiji, the Solomons and Papua New Guinea.10
In 2003, Calvert again reflected on the structural reforms pursued by DFAT that
rendered it capable of being ‘nimble and versatile, while still able to nurture
and deploy a broad array of expertise and professional skills’.
Our goal has been to have not just high-quality and highly motivated
staff, but staff who are well led and well managed; and staff who can
deliver outcomes with respect to the Government’s policy objectives and
have careers that are professionally and personally fulfilling.11
Calvert remarked that ‘DFAT, like all public-sector agencies, has embraced very
significant change over the past few years in response to the imperative for
smaller, more cost-effective government’ and outlined a number of structural
reform initiatives aimed at strengthening the organisation, including:
• centralising the management of staffing (while at the same time maintaining
DFAT’s ‘traditionally decentralised flows of policy advice to ministers’) in
order to confer an increased capacity to be ‘responsive, flexible and efficient
with respect to the deployment of staff’ whilst ensuring fairness and
transparency in relation to postings, placements and promotions;
• decreasing the number of staff working in the corporate management and
corporate service areas ‘in a rational and efficient manner, without detracting
from [DFAT’s] pursuit of the Government’s other key policy objectives’; and
• delivering savings with respect to internal administrative practices through
streamlining and outsourcing and leveraging technology.
He remarked that these changes enabled ‘a much sharper focus on the
Department's core foreign and trade policy responsibilities, and on the practical
services we provide to the Australian public.’
Michael L’Estrange — Secretary via ‘the road less travelled’
In his six-and-a-half years as secretary, Ashton Calvert shepherded important
and extensive reforms credited ‘sharpening the Department's focus and lifting
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its morale and productivity’.12 These important legacies were appreciated by
his successor, Michael L’Estrange who, in 2005, was able to observe: ‘I inherited
a department that worked extremely well’ (Malone 2006: 37). Nevertheless, he
added that the job ‘is relentless and unpredictable to an extent because you are
reacting to events’ (Malone 2006: 39).
In a 2006 address to the National Press Club entitled ‘Responding to Twenty-First
Century Challenges: DFAT in a Changing World’, L’Estrange noted the practical
challenges faced by an organisation as complex as DFAT in which:
• Australia-based staff number just over 2000, of whom around a quarter are
posted overseas at any one time;
• overseas postings include 87 Embassies, High Commissions, Consulates and
Multilateral Missions in 74 States; and
• operations are conducted in 61 different currencies.
He also drew attention to the growing demand for consular services and support
for travellers and Australian’s abroad, including:
• substantial consular support services to Australians overseas (just under
16,000 cases in the year to June 2006);
• regular updates to travel advisories to 152 destinations; and
• issuing over 1.2 million passports to eligible Australians (in 2005–06).13
L’Estrange reflected on the fact that the APS and DFAT had changed
fundamentally in the 25 years since he joined the public service, as a result of
management reforms and broader environmental changes resulting in DFAT
being ‘intricately involved in the wide-ranging policy implications of increasing
globalisation and because across so many areas of national policy — from security
issues to national economic competitiveness to many others — the interaction
between domestic and international considerations is more active and porous
than ever before’.14
In a 2006 article published in The Sydney Papers, L’Estrange refers to the ‘whole
of government’ realities of contemporary governance, noting that the time was
‘long gone’ when ‘matters to do with “foreign policy” were clearly demarcated
from those relating to “domestic policy”’ (L’Estrange 2006: 74). He goes on to
say that, more than ever before, ‘Australia’s international and domestic interests
are significantly more aligned today — whether it be in relation to security
issues or economic growth or national competitiveness’ (L’Estrange 2006: 74-75).
Mindful of ‘whole-of-government realities’, L’Estrange observes the priority
attached to ‘developing close and effective’ relationships with ‘the many
departments and agencies which have important international operations or
comparative benchmarks that increasingly share areas of intersection’ (L’Estrange
2006: 74-75).
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According to L’Estrange, the position of secretary has provided ‘unique insights
into the scale of the difficulties, dangers and personal risks that officers of the
Department can face’ in the course of their duties. His summary of the qualities
and attributes required of DFAT officers can be seen as a microcosm of the
challenges facing the department as a whole:
… we require of those who work today for the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade a wide range of attributes. We require of them
diplomatic skills — not of an effete, outdated or arcane kind but of a
practical, hard-nosed and outcomes-oriented character. We require
informed judgment and carefully focused activism. We require of our
officers high quality advocacy skills to be applied within and beyond
government. We require of them an awareness of appropriate
opportunities for Australian export enterprises and a capacity to support
them. And we require of them personal qualities that enable them to
support and assist Australians in times of emergency or tragic loss, and
to cope themselves with the pressures that they and their families come
under in particular parts of the world. (L’Estrange 2006: 75)
L’Estrange continues the tradition of scholar turned mandarin — although,
‘mandarin’ may not be the most appropriate term, for as was observed in a 1997
article in the Sydney Morning Herald, men like L’Estrange ‘represent
“Washminster” — the combination of old-style Westminster governance where
public servants operate at arm's length from the elected politicians, and
Washington's system where all senior jobs are political appointments, spilled
when the presidency changes hands’ (Brough and Millett, 1997). Although he
says of his career trajectory ‘I came to the position of Secretary by a “road less
travelled” compared to the career path of my predecessors’15 , like Calvert, he
was a Rhodes Scholar and studied at Oxford University, earning a First Class
Honours in philosophy, politics and economics (Calvert also gained a Doctorate
from Oxford University, in mathematics).16
Like Calvert too, L’Estrange has had to navigate some tricky political territory.
Calvert had worked closely with Keating as a senior advisor on international
affairs, yet his professionalism allowed him to rise above any perceived political
association to be appointed secretary of DFAT by John Howard. In a similar
way, L’Estrange continues as secretary under the Rudd government despite a
reputation ‘as a Liberal Party insider and conservative intellectual’ as well as ‘a
close political ally and confidant’ of former Prime Minister, John Howard (Malone
2006: 40). Clearly, professionalism and intellectual rigour are highly prized in
this post as is experience in senior diplomatic posts (L’Estrange was High
Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 2000 to 2005; Calvert was Ambassador
to Japan from 1993 to 1998).
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Still, the transition has not been entirely smooth sailing. In a recent article in
the Sunday Mail veteran journalist, Glen Milne, alleged that L’Estrange had been
deliberately omitted from the Prime Minister’s entourage on his recent foray
overseas, missing key meetings with US President George W. Bush, members of
the US Congress and the US Chamber of Commerce, presumably because of his
reputation as a ‘Howard loyalist’ (Milne 2008).17  Indeed, it is possible that
working with a Prime Minister who is himself a former career diplomat might
be a greater source of potential tension than any ideological differences, real or
imagined. In any case, a degree of initial wariness is in keeping with the expected
‘rough and tumble’ of a period of political and administrative transition in which
new governments generally hold suspect the impartiality and capacity of the
bureaucracy, preferring the counsel of ministerial advisers, favoured lobbyists
and assorted apparatchiks. Transition-of-government is a period of
relationship-building and trust-building. The Rudd government’s transition to
office has, in fact, been remarkably smooth in marked contrast to the purge of
departmental heads that followed Howard’s ascension in 1996.
The future
Certainly, a transition of government would form a part of the fabric of the
broader challenge of ‘discerning clearly the elements of continuity and change
in the international environment’ to which L’Estrange addressed himself in his
2006 article. In the article he observes that, while not a new challenge for the
department, it is nevertheless a challenge that ‘bears very directly on the role
and responsibilities of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’ because,
‘in its modern form, it is a more complex, demanding and variable one than it
has ever been’:
Meeting this challenge requires the Department to show innovation and
flexibility in responding to the dynamics of positive change. But it also
calls for consistency, realism and steadiness of purpose in responding to
the dynamics of continuity where the requirements for security and
stability have not changed and where Australian interests are enduring.
That is why issues of change and continuity lie at the heart of the
Department's responsibilities and why they are so critical to the
advancement of Australian interests. (L’Estrange 2006: 83)
In a sense, the administrative, management and leadership challenges faced by
Calvert and L’Estrange (and any future secretary of the department) reflect the
continuation of about 25 years of ongoing and intensive structural reform and
organisational change. Indeed, each of the secretaries whose experience is shared
in this volume has had to constructively manage significant structural and
institutional changes. The last 25 years has also seen significant domestic social
and political transformation, international and geopolitical realignment and
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economic repositioning. So too, the period has been characterised by rapid and
profound technological change — not least of which is the revolution in
communications technologies that have dramatically transformed the way large
organisations do business. If the challenges, as observed by L’Estrange, are
‘complex, demanding and variable’, it is because the drivers of foreign and trade
policy — not to mention institutional, structural and micro-economic reform —
are similarly complex, demanding and variable. Change, and the need to respond
positively and creatively to change, never stops.
Which, of course, is just another way of saying ‘the job is never done’.
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Epilogue: ‘The job is never done’

Appendix 1: Data on DFAT staff
numbers and budget allocations
for the financial years 1979–80, 1984–85,

























































$153.030 m$122.901 m$88.882 m$63.639 m$31.041 mAustralian
Government
Payments1
(30 June 2000)(30 June 1995)(30 June 1990)(30 June 1985)(30 June 1980) 
 
1 Australian Government general government sector payments
2 Total (Foreign Affairs excluding ADAB (1984/1985) / AIDAB (1989/1990))
Sources: DFAT Annual Reports for 1979–80, 1984–85, 1989–90, 1994–95 and 1999–2000.
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